Darwin's Metaphor:
Nature's Place in Victorian Cultureby
Robert M. Young
[ Introduction | Preface | Chapter: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Notes | Bibliography | Index ]
Notes
Notes are indicated by page number followed by the paragraph number and three identifying words. The surname of the author is given with the year of publication and page number. If there is more than one publication by the author in that year, a letter is added to the date. Full references are given in the bibliography. Thus, for example, the first reference means that on page 2 in the first paragraph, the quotation which ends "face of nature." can be found in William Hazlitt's essay "Mr. Malthus," which appeared in 1904, at page 159. Square brackets indicate anonymous authorship.
CHAPTER 1 The impact of Darwin on conventional thought
2.1 "face of nature." Hazlitt (1904), 159.
2.1 all English life. Willey (1966), 43; House (1966), 74.
3.2 "all reasonable bounds." Lyell (1830-3), 1, 156; cf. Cannon (1960a).
4.2 100,000 by 1865. See below, p. 64.
5.1 "angry and confused." Henkin (1963), 62.
5.2 "a pagan nation." F. Taylor (1966), 195.
5.2 "were too divergent." Dillenberger (1961), 224; cf. Chapter 1. "The Darwinian Impact."
5.2 "mind of man." Romanes (1892-97), 1, 256-7.
5.3 "moral is annulled."
[Chambers] (1844), 333-4; cf 1st ed., 315. This crucial passage is modified in later editions; see 12th ed., (1884), 373 and lxvii.
6.1 "threw it down......" Clark and Hughes (1890), II, 83-4.
6.1 Review for 1845, [Sedgwick] (1845).
6.1 philosophy of Locke. Sedgwick (1850).
6.2 on the Flood. Sedgwick (1831), 313-14.
6.2 literally than others. Buckland (1820); Buckland (1823). See also Millhauser (1954).
7.1 "in its age." Cockburn (1845), 1. See also Haber (1959).
7.1 "[of the Bible]." Cockburn (1845), 24.
7.1 "indirectly to atheism?" Cockburn (1845), 42.
7.2 "and his history." Darwin (1967), 488.
7.2 Oxford in 1860. Huxley (1900), 1, 179-89. Cf. The Athenaeum (14 July 1860), 64-5, and Fleming (1950), chapter 7. The confrontation was occasioned by Draper's paper to Section D, "On the Intellectual Development of Europe, considered with Reference to the Views of Mr. Darwin and others, that the Progression of Organisms is determined by Law," and Fleming provides a balanced account of the much-disputed encounter. Cf. Lucas (1979).
8.1 "himself his nature." [Wilberforce](1860), 258.
8.2 in sensitive areas. Temple et al. (1860); [Harrison] (1860); [Wilberforce] (1861);
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[Stanley] (1861). Innumerable pamphlets appeared attacking the authors. Six volumes are collected in the Cambridge University Library.
8.2 the usual reasons. Tyndall (1874), 63-4; cf "Apology for the Belfast Address" (1874) and "The Rev. James Martineau and the Belfast Address," reprinted in Tyndall (1889), II, chapters 10 and 11; Eve and Creasey (1945), chapter 15.
8.2 has been published. Bibby (1967).
9.1 doubt the Incarnation. I am indebted in Fr. Derek Holmes, who provided this example from his research on Newman.
9.1 in the 1860s. Huxley (1959), 112-38.
11.1 passage in question. Whewell (1840), II, 150 and 148. I am greatly indebted to Walter/Faye Cannon whose interpretation of Darwin's work as an expression of natural theology has been a most important influence on my own rendering of the Darwinian debate. See Cannon (1961).
11.2 "powers of nature." Powell (1838); Powell (1855), Essay 3; Powell (1860), 139; cf. Powell (1838), 268-9, 306-7. Powell (1855), 466, shows his separation of man's moral nature from his physical constitution. For letters from Darwin to Powell, see de Beer (1959), 51-4. Darwin praises Powell's "Philosophy of Creation" in later editions of On the Origin of Species (1872a), page xx. I am indebted to Professor Owen Chadwick for drawing my attention to the fact that Powell's works were read only by the intelligentsia. This was the germ of the interpretation of the debate in this essay. See Chadwick (1966-70), 1, chapter 8, section 3, especially 553-6.
11.3 flood as punishment. [Whitaker] (1819).
11.3 to Adam Sedgwick. Cockburn (1845), Appendix; cf. Clark and Hughes (1890), II, 76-80.
12.1 the Quarterly Review. [Wilberforce] (1860).
12.1 Science and Religion. Draper (1875); White (1960); Simpson (1925). See also Lack (1957). Not all of these authors advocated a conflict; they reflected a prevailing conception in their writings, whatever their own views on the matter.
12.1 and its implications. Ellegard (1958).
12.2 "these learnings together." Bacon (1850),1, 4.
13.1 Origin of Species. [Fitton] (1823), 197-8, 230, 233-4; Buckland (1820), 28-9; [Lyell] (1827), 483; Sedgwick (1850), clxxii; Darwin (1967), ii. For an excellent discussion of the debate on scientific explanation in this period, see Cannon (1960).
13.1 "character of both." Powell (1838), 231; cf. 240.
13.1 species from another. [Chambers] (1846), 95, 154-5; cf. Chambers (1884), 155-6.
14.2 and so on. Lyell (1881), 1, 467-9; Babbage (1837). Herschel's are quoted in the Appendix; see especially 225-7; cf Cannon (1961a); Wallace (1889), 477-8.
14.2 "by the creator." Darwin (1967), 84, 488.
14.2 "[this] one globe." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 86.
14.3 in natural causation.) Spencer (1904), II, 6.
15.1 in Westminster Abbey, Moore (1982). The author was kind enough to send me an offprint with the note "Wasn't this an old idea of yours?"
15.1 "works of God." Stanley (1966), 250; Darwin (1887), III, Appendix 1; Cruse (1935), 107.
15.2 "physical truth also." Temple (1884), 188.
15.2 Archbishop of Canterbury. Anon. (1862). Cf. Willey "Septem contra Christum," chapter 4 of Willey (1956) and Hunt (1896), chapter 14. When Temple was appointed to the Bishopric of Exeter in 1869, a High Church journal described the event as "the darkest crime which had been perpetrated in the English Church" (quoted in Elliott-Binns [I956], 25).
16.1 "and a Positivist." Quoted in Osborne (1894), 141. A fuller and more complicated picture of scientific naturalism in this period would involve a careful consideration of various adumbrations of the Comtist doctrine, along with a discussion of the impact of Positivism on J. S. Mill, G. H. Lewes, Spencer, and
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Notes to Pages 16-24
Huxley, as well as the expository and polemical works of Harriet Martineau, John Morley, and Frederic Harrison. The temptation to use the Positivist movement as an all-embracing umbrella for too many aspects of scientific naturalism has led me to prefer omission to the risk of increased confusion. See Annan (1959); Sklair (1968); Everett (1939), chapter 3; Eisen (1964, 1967, 1967a, 1968); Simon (1963); Kolakowski (1972).
16.2 "various kindred sciences." [Lyell] (1827),474-5.
16.2 "a beneficent necessity." [Spencer] (1857), 484. (The texts of this and other essays reprinted in Spencer [1901] were considerably altered in the light of his later views.) Spencer had argued for inevitable progress before he had worked out his evolutionary theory. See Spencer (1851), 65.
17.1 an impenetrable mystery. [Spencer] (1857), 484-5.
17.1 could engineer it. Burrow (1966), 98-9, III, 222.
18.1 "are being, evolved." Darwin (1967), 484-90.
18.2 barons in America. Hofstadter (1955); Persons (1963); Rogers (1972); Bannister (1979); Young (in press); Durant (in press).
18.2 on conventional belief. Bagehot (1869). Cf. Driver (1967).
19.1 "ever be tending." Wallace (1864), 185.
19.1 "side of them." Wallace (1901), 380.
20.1 'thy glorious birth!' Wallace (1901), 388-9. The verse is by J. H. Dell. I have been unable to obtain any information about him.
20.1 "for our view." Meek (1954a), 171; cf 172-88 for selections from Marx and Engels on Darwin. See also Marx and Engels (1965), 123, 128, 171, 202, 239, 301, 302, 307, 368 for their continuing ruminations on Darwinism and its relations with socialism.
21.1 "(Signed) Charles Darwin." Quoted in Kolman (1931), 702. Darwin (1887), III, 236, 237. Fay (1978), 138, 139, 133n.-134n. It was thought for many years - and retailed in an earlier version of this essay - that this letter was addressed to Marx, who was supposed to have asked to dedicate volume II of Capital to Darwin. There has recently been a priority dispute among those who claim to have straightened this matter out. It has been conclusively resolved in Fay (1980); cf. Kolman (1931); Colp (1974, 1976); Feuer (1975, 1978); Paul (1979, 1983).
21.3 is bodily growth. Draper (1901), I, iii.
CHAPTER 2 Malthus and the evolutionists
24.1 relatively unconnected studies. For a useful discussion of problems in the historiography of science as seen from within the "history of science" profession, see Kuhn (1968). His later views include ambivalent remarks on the essay reprinted here: Kuhn (1970); Kuhn (1971), 301-2.
24.2 of evolutionary theory. For examples, see Cowles (1936), especially 341; Henkin (1963), 47; Zirkle (1941), especially 99-104; Sandow (1938), especially 322-4; Bock (1955, 1964); Bush (1980), chapter 5, especially 113-14; Gillispie (1959), 38, 212, 215-16 227; Eisley (1961), 53, 101-2, 179-82, 331-2.; Himmelfarb (1959), 132-9; Himmelfarb (1968), 82-110; Habakkuk (1959); Levin (1966), 102; Smith (1960). The connection between Malthus and evolutionary theory is, surprisingly, not mentioned in Bagehot (1915) or in Smith (1951).
24.2 mechanism of evolution. It is a contentious claim that the evolutionary debate occurred almost wholly within the context of natural theology rather than as a conflict between science and theology. For evidence to support this claim, see Cannon (1960, 1961). See also above, chapter 1 and below, chapter 5. For some reason which I have been unable to grasp, the Darwinian scholar M. J. S. Hodge thinks that this is an idea which should be rooted out of Darwinian studies. He made this point very forcibly at the Darwin Heritage Conference in Florence in the summer of 1982. I could follow neither the force of his argument nor the passion which seemed to lie behind it.
24.2 of the century. This essay has a subsidiary historiographic aim. The method of
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Notes to Pages 24-30
textual exegesis used in sections III-VIII is intended to provide some reassurance that influence studies need not find themselves in quite the parlous conceptual limbo which some criticisms imply. See Skinner (1966) and Dunn (1968), whose position is closer to my own.
24.3 can increase arithmetically. For expositions and criticisms of Malthus' theory, see Smith (1951), 275; cf. Books 3 and 4; Flew (1957, 1970).
25.1 of the fittest. There can be no doubt of the contemporary significance of Malthus' theory. For example, in his essay on Malthus, William Hazlitt (1825) implied that it was an open question whether or not Malthus had "endeavoured to spread gloom over the hopes and more sanguine speculations of man, and to cast a slur on the face of nature . . ." Hazlitt (1904), 159. Among twentieth-century historians, Basil Willey claimed that ". . . Malthus had raised a spectre which haunted half the century; nature was niggardly rather than profuse, and, without stern measures, population would soon outrun means of subsistence" (Willey [1966], 43). See also above p. 2.
25.2 occasioned his Essay. A certain amount of printer's ink has been spilled on the question of whether or not the following exposition correctly conveys "what Malthus said." I find this odd, since one of the principal points of this essay (along with others of mine) is that "what someone said" has everything to do with what they were taken to have said. There are five readings of Malthus in this essay. There is no neutral text for us, any more than there is a neutral observation language in science or an unmediated nature for people. This is my reply to Bowler (1976); cf. LeMahieu (1979); Young (in press). [Malthus] (1798), 1, i, 10-15; Godwin (1842). I am not here concerned with the development of Godwin's views or with the debate between Godwin and Malthus in the early decades of the nineteenth century. See Brown (1926).
25.2 "look about them." Hazlitt (1904), 161.
25.3 and in hiding. Condorcet (1955); [Malthus] (1798), chapter 9; Frazer (1927); Koyré (1948).
26.1 to indefinite perfectibility. Condorcet (1955), 142, 193-202.
26.1 for man's enlightenment. Condorcet (1955), 149 ff., 186-96.
26.1 to this hope. Condorcet (1955), 200-1.
26.1 the human race. Condorcet (1955), 180, 188-9.
26.2 "progress of truth." [Empson] (1836), 494.
26.3 was radically changed. Malthus (1826), I, 1.
26.4 the Malthusian debate. Smith (1951), 49.
26.4 for thirty years. Bonar (1924), 2.
26.4 thirty pages long. Banks and Glass (1953).
26.4 "he found it." Hazlitt (1904), 19, 160.
27.1 should it arise. [Malthus] (1798), iii-iv, 7; Malthus (1826), 1, iii (preface to second ed.). For a discussion of a number of Malthus' precursors, see Smith (1951), chapter 1; cf Darwin (1794-6), I, 570; Darwin (1799), 556; Bonar (1966).
27.2 of the Deity. Paley (1816), chapters 23-7.
27.2 by natural means. Paley (1816), 360-79.
27.2 "object of contrivance." Paley (1816), 392, 399, 401.
27.2 a slow one. Paley (1816), 402-8.
28.1 "called in question." Paley (1816), 408-13.
28.1 " must be changed). "Paley (1816), 421-32, esp. 421-2.
28.1 "labour, servitude, restraint." Paley (1816), 432-3.
28.1 "very little reason." Paley (1816), 434, 435-9, 444-7.
29.1 "and Mr. Pitt." [Empson] (1836), 483.
29.1 "God to man." [Malthus] (1798), 349, quoting Alexander Pope's Essay on Man.
29.1 to human life. [Malthus] (1798), iv.
29.1 to produce progress. [Malthus] (1798), 360-1.
29.1 "mother of invention." [Malthus] (1798), 358.
29.1 "the savage state." [Malthus] (1798), 361-4.
30.1 an industrious cultivator. Paley (1785), iv, 478-81. In an unpublished manu
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Notes of Pages 30-36
script, "The Crisis, a View of the Present Interesting State of Great Britain by a Friend of the Constitution," Malthus wrote in 1796: "I cannot agree with Arch-deacon Paley, who says, that the quantity of happiness in any country is best measured by the number of people. Increasing population is the most certain possible sign of the happiness and prosperity of a state; but the actual population may be only a sign of the happiness that is past"; quoted in [Empson] (1836), 482; cf. 479.
30.2 "line of argumentation." Darwin (1958a), 59.
31.1 gained from Lyell David Kohn thinks I have Lyell in the wrong group here; I cannot decide. Kohn (1980), 169n. 137.
31.2 "to its possessor." Darwin (1967), 201.
31.3 theodicy at work. For example, see Malthus (1826), 1, 92; II, 5, 42-3, 84-5.
31.3 "restraint" from marriage. Malthus (1826), 1, vii-viii (preface to second ed. [1803], 15, 15n.-17n.
31.3 was not stressed. [Malthus] (1798), chapter 4.
32.1 "a new work." Malthus (1826), I, v-vi (preface to second ed. [1803]).
32.2 in the Creation. Chalmers (1833), I, ix-xi; Brock (1966).
33.1 on man's body; Kidd (1834).
33.2 "not vice versa". Hanna and Macfadyen (1910), 810; cf. Hanna (1854); Chalmers (1832), 126, 134, 457; Stephen (1900), II, 242-50; Watt (1943).
33.2 "most triumphant exemplifications." Letter dated 7 February 1811, quoted in Hanna (1862), 1, 381-2.
33.2 "as a degradation." Hanna (1862), 1, 384. "It is in the power of charity to corrupt its object; it may tempt him to indolence - it may lead him to renounce all dependence on himself - it may nourish the meanness and depravity of his character - it may lead him to hate exertion, and resign without a sigh the dignity of independence. It could easily be proved, that if charity was carried to its utmost extent, it would unhinge the constitution of society. It would expel from the land the blessings of industry. Every man would repose on the beneficence of another; every incitement to diligence would be destroyed. The evils of poverty would multiply to such an extent as to be beyond the power of the most unbounded charity to redress them; and instead of an elysium of love and plenty, the country would present the nauseating spectacle of sloth and beggary and corruption." Hanna (1862), 1, 381.
33.2 "of honest independence." Hanna (1862), I, 385; cf. [Chalmers] (1817-18).
34.1 "can be laid." Chalmers (1832), 240; cf. 31-2, 58, 70-71, 134, 297-8, 305, 328, 357, 386-7, chapter 14, 421, 433-4, 438-9, 446-7, 522, 554, etc. Although Chalmers'place in Schumpeter (1954) is confined to "Some of Those Who Also Ran," his work was influential in Scotland, and his Political Economy was considered by Schumpeter to be "a book of considerable importance" (486-7).
34.1 "glimpse of hope." [Scrope] (1832), 39.
34.1 "to be subsisted!" [Scrope] (1832), 40.
35.1 thereby encouraging breeding. [Scrope] (1832), 44. There was a clear warrant for this conclusion in Malthus' Essay, sixth edition (1826): "The most general rule that can be laid down on this subject is, perhaps, that any direct encouragements to marriage must be accompanied by an increased mortality." Malthus (1826), I, 329; cf. 462, II, 81-2.
35.1 "of human beings...." [Scrope] (1832), 45.
35.1 "moonstruck, Laputan philosophy." [Scrope] (1832), 62.
35.1 "a Christian education." [Scrope] (1832), 67.
35.1 of the legislature." [Scrope] (1832) 68-9. It was on just this point (which was echoed by J. S. Mill) that Marx, Engels, Henry George, and A. R. Wallace parted company with Malthus. See below, sections VI and VIII
35.2 his moral ones. Chalmers (1833), 11, 98-9.
36.1 "the natural world." Chalmers (1833), II, 100-1.
36.1 "suffering at all." Chalmers (1833), II, 102-3.
36.1 "which he occupies." Chalmers (1833), II, 112.
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Notes of Pages 37-48
37.1 "of cultivated life." Chalmers (1833), II, 49-51.
38.1 "of a throne." Chalmers (1833), 11, 292-3.
38.2 "its own purpose." Malthus (1826), II, 82-3; cf. 84, 86, 108-9.
38.2 "to parish assistance." Malthus (1826), II, 337-8.
39.1 language and neologisms. Anon. (1833), 4-5.
40.1 "sketch of it." Darwin (1958a), 120.
40.2 "habits of animals." Darwin (1868), I, 10; cf. Darwin (1874), 44-6.
41.1 to future generations. Darwin (1967), 4-5.
41.1 "the Galapagos Islands." Darwin and Seward (1903), 1, 118-19.
41.1 "and still possess." Darwin (1958a), 120.
41.1 "an enormous ratio." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 116-17.
41.1 "must inevitably tell . . ." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 46-7.
42.1 "owing to struggle." de Beer (1960-1), Part III, 128. Dr. Sidney Smith has been most generous in guiding me through the labyrinth of dates and excised passages in Darwin's notebooks.
42.1 entitled Natural Selection. This was never published during Darwin's lifetime but has recently appeared, edited by Stauffer (1975).
42.1 "the one sentence." Footnote by Gavin de Beer: "This note written on 28th September 1838, makes it possible to identify the sentence in T. R. Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population which enabled Darwin to see how the pressure of natural selection is inevitably brought to bear. It was in the 6th edition, London, 1826, vol. i, p. 6: 'It may be safely pronounced, therefore, that the population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every twenty five years, or increases in a geometrical ratio."'
42.1 "all this wedging." The imagery of wedging and wedges (see below in this quotation) occurs in Darwin's 1838 notebooks and in the 1842 and 1844 essays, as well as in his big book, Natural Selection (unpublished until 1975), as well as in the first edition of the Origin. He removed it after the first edition. For a discussion of this, see Beer (1983), 71-2, 273n. 26.
42.1 "out weaker ones." de Beer et al. (1967), 162-3.
43.1 "number and correlations." de Beer (1960-1), Part IV, 160; cf. de Beer (1967), 166. This quotation is from Malthus (1826), 1, 529.
43.2 "of animated nature." Malthus (1830), 121-2. This nicely summarizes statements which are scattered throughout the 1826 edition of Malthus' Essay, the one which Darwin read.
43.2 volume two alone. Lyell (1833), 2nd edition, II, 58; cf. 125, 136-7, 147, 148, 153, 160, 163, 165, 172, 173, 175, 179, 180-88.
44.2 Journal of Researches. It should be recalled that between 1838 and 1858, Darwin kept the existence of his theory of evolution by natural selection a closely guarded secret, known only to a few close friends. His Journal of Researches helped to raise the question of evolution in Wallace's mind but gave only clues to Darwin's solution to the problem of the mechanism by which evolution might occur.
44.2 Chambers and Combe. [Chambers] (1884), 227, 405ff.; Combe (1835), 191 220-1.
44.2 "of organic species." Wallace (1905), 1, 232, 234-5, 254-5; cf. Wallace (1901), chapters 13 and 16.
45.1 "its independent discovery." Wallace (1905), 1, 240.
45.1 "spark of genius." Wallace (1853), 129. My interpretation of Wallace owes much to an excellent article by McKinney (1966); see also McKinney (1972).
45.1 struggle for existence. McKinney (1966), 346.
45.1 "of the fittest . . ." Wallace (1901), 139.
45.1 degree of effect. See McKinney (1966), 354.
47.1 "fully developing it." Wallace (1905), I, 361-3.
47.1 even more deeply. Wallace (1908).
48.1 his fitful mind. While the influence of Malthus on the actual formation of Darwin's theory is unequivocal, it should be noticed that all of Wallace's accounts
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Notes of Pages 48-51
were written well after the event and are liable to the reservations mentioned by Skinner (1966, 206-10). I find Wallace's retrospective account completely convincing and feel that in each of the cases discussed in this article it is possible to gain a precise idea of the aspects of Malthus' ideas which were influential. Even so, Skinner's reservations did seem to have some sort of conceptual force in the case of Wallace. The acid test is the close study of Darwin's notebooks, manuscripts, and the marginal notes in his own library. It heartens me to reflect fifteen years after this essay was first written - that its main conclusions have stood the test of the most rigorous scholarship in the Darwin manuscripts, although some claim that Darwin's retrospective accounts are not wholly accurate: see below, Chapter 4.
48.2 force transcending nature. The development of Wallace's divergence from Darwin on the question of the adequacy of natural selection to explain human evolution can be traced in the following articles: Wallace (1864, 1870); [Wallace] (1869); Wallace (1889), chapter 15. Darwin was very troubled by Wallace's views. He wrote to Wallace in 1869, "I hope you have not murdered too completely your own and my child." On page 391 of Wallace's article on Lyell, Darwin has written in his copy "No," followed by a shower of exclamation marks. It is on that page that Wallace claims that neither natural selection nor the theory of evolution can account for the origin of sensation or consciousness and goes on to maintain that there are certain physical characteristics of the human race which are not explicable by evolution - the brain, "the organs of speech," "the hand," and "the external form of man." [Wallace] (1869), 391. In the same year Darwin wrote to Wallace, "If you had not told me, I should have thought that [your remarks on Man] had been added by someone else. As you expected, I differ grieviously from you, and I am very sorry for it." Darwin and Seward (1903), II, 39-40; cf. 31-7, 93. For discussions of this controversy, see Romanes (1892-7), II, chapter 1; Eiseley (1961), chapter 9. I have developed the story further in Young (1971a).
48.2 her bounty fairly. George (1962), 98, 130-41, 485-504, 525, 549-550, 558-9.
48.2 for social change. Wallace (1892); Marchant (1916), II, 139-65.
48.2 "a century ago." Marchant (1916), 1, 317-19; cf. 1, 15-16.
48.2 "in his generation." I am indebted to A. R. K. Watkinson for drawing my attention to George's influence; cf. Jones (1968), 48-57; Thomas (1983).
48.2 no mechanism specified. Wallace (1901), Appendix. See also Young (1971a).
48.2 than civilized ones. Wallace (1911), chapter 19.
49.1 Malthus' population theory. Burrow (1966), 183.
49.1 later evolutionary thinking. Spencer (1851); cf. 2nd edition (1892), 120n., 266n.; Young (1967a).
49.1 than special creation. Spencer (1852).
49.1 beyond human society. [Spencer] (1852a).
50.1 of acquired characteristics. Spencer (1904), 1, 389-90.
50.1 the nervous system. Spencer (1855), especially parts III and IV; Spencer (1904), 1, chapter 31; Duncan (1908), chapter 7 and Appendix B. The development of Spencer's psychological theory is discussed in detail in Young (1970), chapters 5-6.
50.2 "its first appearance." [Spencer] (1857). The version of this essay in Spencer's Essays is considerably altered from the original one in the Westminster Review, from which the following quotations are taken.
50.2 "posse of schoolboys." [Spencer] (1857), 453.
50.2 in Social Statics. Spencer (1851), 322, 378-81, 388, 399; cf. Spencer (1904), I, 363.
51.1 "Progress essentially consists." [Spencer] (1857), 447.
51.1 "a beneficent necessity." [Spencer] (1857), 484.
51.2 evolution of animals. See below, pages 112-20; Vorzimmer (1963).
51.2 ethics, and sociology. Spencer (1887), iii-iv. This preface does not appear in the collected Essays.
51.2 and too slow. Spencer (1887), 70-5; cf. 9, 19-22, 29-33, 36-7, 41, 45-6.
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Notes to Pages 52-63
52.2 American robber barons. Hofstadter (1955); Persons (1963); Bagehot (1869); Kidd (1894, 1918); Bannister (1979).
52.2 "for our view." Quoted in Meek (1954a), 171. Darwin wrote in 1879, "What a foolish idea seems to prevail in Germany on the connection between Socialism and Evolution through Natural Selection." Darwin (1887), III, 237.
52.3 English working class. Meek (1954), 22-3.
52.3 "the animal kingdom." Meek (1954), 185-6; cf 173-88.
52.4 "of natural phenomena." Fyfe (1951), 202. "up pseudo-scientific 'laws."' Fyfe (1951), 207.
53.1 "realized in actuality." Fyfe (1951), 210. (They'll love that in the Gulag Archipelago, in Afghanistan, and in Poland.) The arguments used by Marxists are reminiscent of those used by Henry George: Malthus was an apologist for the status quo, and by blaming nature for poverty he relieved humankind of the inclination to improve their lot by social change. See Meek (1954a), 23-5.
53.2 on conditioned reflexes. Jefferson (1960), 40; Brazier (1959), 102-3; Magoun (1960), 188, 193-5, 204.
53.2 "of the people." Quoted in McKenzie (1960), II, 146.
54.1 "theory of heredity." Turbin (1958). Lest it be thought that this example has been chosen for simple political reasons, it should perhaps be added that the United States government took the trouble to translate a series of articles in this vein and to join with the Josiah Macy Foundation and National Science Foundation in distributing them without charge to scientists: Anon. (1960), 946. Several articles in this collection are of particular interest for my historical purposes - those by Frolov, Nuzhdim, Zhukov-Verezhnikov, and Pekhov. Each of these discusses complex philosophical questions around genetics and mechanistic thinking. They also talk a lot of Lysenkoist nonsense.
54.2 "alone affords us." Rogers (1859), 205.
CHAPTER 3 The role of psychology in the evolutionary debate
57.1 or that problem. I should like here to pay tribute to an essay which inspired me to see that I could attempt to apply the full force of my academic training and abilities, such as they are, to current political issues and the role of the human sciences in current politics: Ingleby (1970). An essay of my own written in the same spirit which connects with the argument of this and other essays in this book is Young (1971).
58.2 Descent of Man. Darwin (1874).
58.2 Man and Animals. Darwin (1872).
58.2 of the body. Romanes (1883).
58.3 "permits the attempt." Darwin (1874), 128-9.
58.4 Origin of Species. Darwin (1967), chapter 7.
59.1 "whole [of] metaphysics." Darwin (1887), II, 8.
59.1 "property of matter?" Quoted in de Beer (1963), 108. The issues in this essay, as well as others, have been illuminated by conversation with Howard Gruber, whose research I read in manuscript. See Gruber (1974).
59.2 "my crude notions." Darwin and Seward (1903), II, 51-2.
60.1 of the Descent. Darwin (1874), 3-4.
61.2 occurring in psychology. I have discussed the issues which are here considered only briefly in Young (1970) and in outline in Young (1968a).
62.3 History of Creation. Laycock (1845); cf. his systematic treatise, Laycock (1860); [Chambers] (1844).
63.2 on the brain. Huxley (1959), especially 133-8 for a succinct history ofthe controversy respecting the cerebral structure of man and the apes, which is not reprinted in the standard edition of Huxley's Collected Essays (1893).
63.2 in the mid-1870s. George Rolleston et al., Referees' reports on Ferrier, 1874, Archives of the Royal Society, RR. 7. 299-305, RR. 12. 103.
257
Notes to Pages 63-72
63.2 evolutionary theory. Carpenter (1888).
63. 3 Review in 1828. [Brown] (1803); [Gordon] (1815); [Jeffrey] (1826); [chevenix] (1828). The meaning and context of phrenology in nineteenth-century Britain has been greatly illuminated by the research of Cooter (1978) and his subsequent essays, to which the reader is enthusiastically referred. Anyone who wishes to investigate the fine texture of the Victorian debate as understood in its contemporary context must rely on the indispensable key ti the authorship of the (usually anonymous) essays in the main periodicals provided by the research of Walter E. Houghton (1966), etc.
64.1 their third book.[Chevenix](l828), 17-20;Macalister (1885), 844; advertisement in The Leader, I (1850), 24; Combe., (1866), viii; Peel (1971), II; Gibbon (1878)958), chapter 14.
64.2 not taken up. [Dawkins] (1871); Mivart (1871); Ellegard (1958), chapter 14.
65.1 and human evolution. For exanple, see Lyell (1830-3), I, 156.
65.2 "standing of psychology". Robertson (1876); cf. Bain and Whittaker (1894). The only document I have encountered in the mainstream of the evolutionary debate which makes anything like a serious attempt to integrate the implications of psychology with those of the general evolutionary theory is John Tyndall's nottorious "Belfast Address" to the British Assocations in 1874 (reprinted in Tyndall [1889]; cf. 202-23). He draws primarily in the theories of Spencer, and although his address is a central document in the debate, it is ususally considered to represent the final victory statement of the evolutionists. As such, it is consistent with my general thesis about the sequestration of psychology until after evolution had won the day.
66.1 Review in 1850. [Holland] (1850).
66.1 in that context. Rudwick (1970).
66.1 from accepting evolution. Lyell (1863); L. Wilson (1970)
66.1 raised by phrenology. Hunt (1868-9).
66.1 of earlier preoccupations. Burrow (1963).
66.1 in their work. Burrow (1966).
66.1 than the evolutionisrn. Burrow (1966).
67.2 man is revealing. I have draw this example from Gruber (1965)
68.1 support of evolution. Darwin (1887), III, 8-14.
68.1 "Lubbock and others." Darwin (1887), III, 15-16; Darwin (1874), 2.
68.2 by many streams. For interpretation of the general shape of the evolutionary debates see Cannon (1961); see also above, chapter I.
69.1 or Philosophical Radicals. Haléry (1952); Albee (1962).
69.2, appeared in 1749. Hartley (1966); cf. experts in Herrnstein and Boring (1965) 279-83, 348-55. There are passages in this collection from the writings of nearly all the figures mentioned in this chapter. See Young (1968, 1972b).
70.1 "of the parent." Darwin (1794-6), I, 524-5.
71.2 Chemistry, and politics. Priestley (1790); [Priestley] (1794); Priestley (1965), 9-10.
71.2 Hartleyan psychological mechanism. Godwin (1842), 1, Chapter 9, especially 190n.; Woodcock (1970), chapter 3. in which the author points out that Godwin's influence was most strongly felt in literature and in the devlopment of socialist theory.
71.2 on associationist principles [Mill] (1859).
71.3 an associationist mechanism. Condillac (1930).
71.3 associationism in England. Condorcet (1955); Koyré (1948).
71.3 the primary factor. Lamarck (1963); Wheeler and Barber (1933), Showing Lamarck's abiding interest in psychology.
72.1 of current psychology. I have suggested other aspects of the desirability of integrating hte hisotry of psychology with the hisotry of science in Young (1966), 18-25, and Young (1967), which uses the complex question of the status of the animal mind as a dissecting tool for the history of psychology.
72.3 that they were. Smith (1910). For analyses relating his argument to associationism, See Stephen (1962), II, 53-68; Halévy (1952), 16-18, 88-120; Gray (1968);
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Notes to Pages 72-77
cf.the editor's introduction by Andrew Skinner to the Pelican (abridged edition) of The Wealth of Nations (1970).
72.2 Godwin and Condorcet. [Malthus] (1798).
73.1 "to be born." Malthus (1959), 123-4.
73.1 "mother of invention. . ." Malthus (1959), 124-5.
73.1 "the savage state." Malthus (1959), 126-7.
74.1 by natural selection. See above, chapter 2.
74.2 denied the analogy. Wallace (1858), 275-7; Wallace (1889), vi; cf. below, pp. 99-101.
74.2 "to the mind...." Wallace (1891), 199 200.
74.2 to human nature. On the influence of Owenite socialism, see Wallace (1905), 1, 87, 91-105; II, chapter 24 and the appendix to Wallace (1901); on the influence of Chambers' Vestiges, see Wallace (1905), I, 254-5; on the influence of Combe and phrenology see Wallace (1905), 1, 234-5, and Wallace (1901), chapter 16. Wallace's beliefs in phrenology and socialism played important parts in his retreat from belief in the adequacy of natural selection to account for fundamental features in man's body and mind. See Young (1971a). The influence of phrenology on Owenism is not straightforward. The phrenologists contributed the general orientation that men should be seen in intimate relationship with their environment, and that point of view was used to support innumerable movements and schemes for social improvement, including Owenism. On the other hand, even as modified by Spurzheim and Combe, Gall's theory did not allow sufficient scope for alteration of character as a result of alteration of external conditions. Although the phrenologists provided a general warrant for seeing man in adaptive, biological terms, they clashed with the Owenites over the degree of improvement which changed social conditions could achieve. (George Combe visited New Lanark in 1820, and his brother Abram founded an Owenite community. Owenism was, of course, in full flower before phrenology became a popular movement in Britain, and George Combe was certainly influenced by Owen's environmentalism.) There is a systematic ambiguity between the fundamental assumptions of phrenology and the meliorist uses to which it was put. See Harrison (1969), 86-7, 239-40, where the uneasy relations are mentioned, although Harrison stresses the conflict at the expense of the common assumptions. Chambers' debt to phrenology is unequivocal. See Vestiges (1844), 322-3, 324-60. Chambers' acknowledgement of this debt to Combe's Constitution of Man is reprinted in the 12th edition, in which the authorship of the book is first acknowledged (1884), xxx, xvi. Once again, Roger Cooter (1978) has looked at these matters with great care. On Owen, see especially 262-74.
74.3 book, Social Statics (1851). The development and affiliation of Spencer's evolutionary theory are considered in detail in Young (1970), chapters 5-6 and above, 48-52, as well as in Young (1968).
75.2 Principles of Psychology. Spencer (1855).
75.2 "Law and Cause," [Spencer] (1857).
75.2 sociology, and ethics. Spencer (1862).
75.2 in political theory. Peel (1971) provides an excellent analysis of Spencer's work in its social and intellectual contexts, with an assessment of his influence. This should be complemented by the account given by Macrae in his introduction to the Pelican edition of Spencer's essays (1969), in which "The Social Organism" is particularly relevant to the points stressed here.
76.1 Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Stengel (1954, 1963).
76.1 of industrial democracy. Bagehot (1869); Driver (1967); Dewey (1930); Geiger (1951).
76.2 Mill on induction. Strong (1955); Ellegard (1957); Madden (1960), chapters 9-10.
76.2 "Mid-Nineteenth Century Britain," Smith (1970); cf. Smith (1977).
77.1 "is probably Will-Force." Wallace (1891), 211; cf. Wallace (1889), chapter 15.
259
Notes of Pages 79-85
CHAPTER 4 Darwin's metaphor: does nature select?
79.1 "in its influence." Lewes (1868), 503.
79.1 about its nature. Lewes (1867-71), especially "Prolegomena," "Sixth Epoch" - "Eighth Epoch," and "Eleventh Epoch"; Huxley (1879); Sully (1879); Mead (1936); Merz (1896-1912), II, chapters 8-11; Somervell (1929), 123-41; Everett (1939), chapter 4; Cassirer (1950), chapter 9; Passmore (1957), chapter 2; Metz (1938), chapter 3; Houghton (1957); Grisewood et al. (1966), 33-45, 71-7, 86-93, 173-243; Briggs (1959), 394-402., 479-88. Many historical journals produced Darwin Centenary numbers in 1959, e.g., Victorian Studies, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Notes and Records of the Royal Society, which contain useful reviews of the literature. See also Appleman et al. (1959), 13-95.
79.1 but a part. See chapter 1.
79.1 might have occurred. Wilkie (1959); Eisley (1961); Irvine (1959); de Beer (1963); Ghiselin (1969). A rather better perspective is provided by Greene (1961, 1975, 1981).
80.1 primarily a naturalist. See Young (1971a).
80.2 be taken seriously. Lewes (1868), 356, 364, 475, 502.. See also Huxley (1887), especially 196-7.
81.1 "from my predecessors." de Beer (1959), 52-3.
81.2 and scientific methodology. Chadwick (1966-70), I, 558-72; II, 1-111.
81.2 rather imprecise accounts. There is a vast literature purporting to assess Darwin's influence in various fields. I list here a selection of books and articles I have found useful but which still illustrate the point. Mackintosh (1899); Angell (1909); Dewey (1909); Baldwin (1909); Seward (1909), a collection of essays by eminent scientists, philosophers, social scientists, psychologists, historians, etc.; Bower et al. (1925), similar scope to Seward volume; Howard (1927); Cravens and Burnham (1971); Raven (1943), chapters 3-4; Henkin (1963); Fisch (1947); Wiener (1949); Hofstadter (1955); Wood (1955), chapter 3; Ellegard (1957); Irvine (1959a); Passmore (1959); Randall (1961); Dillenberger (1961), chapter 8; Burrow (1966); Goldman (1959-60); Buckley (1967). Young (1967) is an overview on the philosophical issues raised by the animal mind.
82.2 from the mainland. Smith (1960), especially 393. See also below - letter to Wallace (86) - and Darwin (1967), 1.
82.3 him in Montevideo. Darwin (1887), II, chapter 1, etc. See also editor's foreword and introduction by Francis Darwin in Darwin and Wallace (1958), especially 23. This volume contains reprints of Darwin's "Sketch of 1842," his "Essay of 1844," and the joint Darwin-Wallace paper of 1858.
82.3 "mystery of mysteries." de Beer (1960-1); de Beer et al. (1967); Cannon (1961a), especially 305; Darwin (1967), I.
83.1 day to day. Gruber (1974).
83.2 well-marked varieties. Darwin (1967), 52. See also Vorzimmer (1969a).
83.3 history of life. Lyell gave a concise statement of his aims in a letter to Roderick Murchison in 1829; see Lyell (1881), 1, 234-5. See also Hooykaas (1963); Rudwick (1970, 1969a, 1972).
83.3 about the past. Lyell (1830-3), 1, chapter 9, and II, chapters 1-5, 8, especially 27-32, 49, 62-3. Citations from first edition of I and III, but from second edition of II.
84.1 and probably confused. Lyell (1830-3), II, 58 re "struggle for existence"; II, chapter 8 and pp. 24, 131 ff. re new species. See also Lyell (1881), I, 467-8.
84.1 with crucial reservations. See the tenth edition of Lyell's Principles of Geology (1867-8); cf [Wallace] (1869).
48.2 "done this less - . ." Darwin and Seward (1903), II, 117.
48.3 species, divinely created. Lyell (1830-3), I, 153; II chapter I, re Lamarck; I chapters 1-5 re Catastrophism.
85.1 noire, catastrophist geology. Hooykaas (1963); see also the series of articles
260
Notes to Pages 85-90
in which he develops his case: Hooykaas (1956, 1957, 1965, 1966); cf. Cannon (1960a).
85.1 and Darwin's views, Rudwick (1967, 1971, 1972).
85.2 on the other. This is my settled view, although it has been much disputed. The place from which to follow the debate is Kohn (1980), 136-40, who does not explain Darwin's many retrospective claims, quoted below, that this analogy was his path in his discovery, as well as in his expositions. The doubters need to explain (away?) Darwin's accounts. I take some comfort from Olroyd's (1984) survey on the Malthusian front, if not on the role of the analogy between artificial and natural selection in the early process of Darwin's discovery.
85.2 the main conclusions. See chapter 2 and Vorzimmer (1969).
86.1 increasingly precise meaning. Gruber (1974). Sol Adler writes from the Peace Hotel, Peking, to point out that my interpretation of Malthus' influence on Darwin is difficult to reconcile with pages 95-100 of de Beer's Charles Darwin (1963). De Beer objects to the view that Darwin's theory was influenced by "the social and economic conditions of Victorian England" (100). De Beer did not seem to have examined the pages which Darwin excised from his notebooks - the more important passages which he intended to use in his volume on Natural Selection - when he wrote his biography of Darwin. In his introduction to Robert Chambers' Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1969), de Beer grasped that Malthus' theory supplied Darwin with "exactly what he needed to put the coping stone on his principle of natural selection" (17). I would continue to argue that Darwin's thinking drew on a wide context of Victorian ideas. One of the purposes of writing the study of Malthus was to help free the history of science from the internalist approach exemplified by de Beer's works. His introduction to Vestiges reveals the same bias. There is (though it is hard to credit) an even sillier version of this position in Mayr (1982), in a section entitled "Darwin's Debt to Malthus," which David Kohn was kind enough to point out to me. I find it odd that Mayr admires Kohn's work so much while ignoring Kohn's own confirmation of my position on this matter. Eminent working biologists of the generation of de Beer and Mayr appear to be outraged by the notion that the ideas of an epoch are constituted by the cultural and ideological forces at work in that epoch. See below, chapter 6.
86.2 "have thought so . . ." Darwin (1887), II, 23.
86.2 "known about domestication." Darwin (1887), II, 29-30.
86.2 the Galapagos Islands. Darwin and Seward (1903), I, 118-19.
87.1 "done for domestic." Darwin (1887), II, 116-18.
87.1 "neglected by naturalists." Darwin (1967), 4.
87.2 "means of selection." Darwin and Wallace (1958), v.
87.2 "to wild animals." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 43.
88.1 "of this universe." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 45-6.
88.1 "rigid and scrutinizing." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 48.
88.1 "to their kind . . ." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 58.
88.1 "[this] one globe." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 86.
88.1 "and True Species." Darwin and Wallace (1958), III.
89.1 that way around, Darwin (1887), 1, 333. See also Darwin's complimentary remarks about Vestiges in the "Historical Sketch" which he added to later editions of the Origin (e.g., 6th edition [1872a], xvi-xvii).
89.2 "of a part." Chambers (1884), lxix-lxx.
89.2 "from Deity itself." [Chambers] (1844), 359-60.
89.3 of evolutionary change. For the story of the authorship of Vestiges see 12th edition (1884), vii-xxxi - "Story of the Authorship of the 'Vestiges' Told for First Time" - and Millhauser (1959). For criticisms of Vestiges on philosophical grounds see Herschel (1846), especially xlii-xliii; [Huxley] (1854), especially 428-9; cf. Darwin (1887), II, 187-9.
90.1 "as verae causae. " Lewes (1868), 356.
90.1 sequel entitled Explanations, [Chambers] (1846).
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Notes to Pages 90-97
90.1 "idea some countenance." Chambers (1884), Ivi, xl.
90.2 "Philosophy of Creation," Powell (1855), 313-503.
91.1 species became modified. Darwin (1872a), xx, where Darwin compliments Powell.
91.3 "stages physically necessitated". Spencer (1904), II, 6. For further remarks on Spencer's evolutionary theory and evolutionary philosophy, see Young (1967a); Young (1970), 167-72, 186-96.
91.3 "order of nature." Lyell (1830-3) 1, 144; cf. 165.
92.1 "endanger all science." Powell (1855), 354-5.
92.1 "of new species." Powell (1855), 420.
92.3 "records answers others." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 265, 256.
93.1 "of new forms." Darwin (1887) , II, 125.
93.2 the official paradigm. I have discussed some of the philosophical issues raised by the departure of the biological, behavioral, and social sciences from the official paradigm of explanation of the physicochemical sciences in a paper entitled "Persons, Organisms,......and Primary Qualities," delivered to the British Society for the Philosophy of Science in London, 1969; cf. Young (1967).
93.4 "those of Art." Darwin (1967), 61.
94.1 "act most effectually." Darwin (1967), 80
94.1 "not nature effect?" Darwin (1967), 83.
94.2 "Conditions of life." Darwin (1967), 84.
94.2 a recurring phrase. Darwin (1967) ,e.g., 108-9 and 410.
94.2 "skill each improvement." Darwin (1967), 189.
94.3 "in itself probable." Darwin (1967), 467, 469.
95.1 "man can explain." Darwin (1967), 471; cf. Huxley (1869), 115-16.
95.2 "sake of brevity. " Darwin (1967), 127. John Tyndall certainly thought the phrase harmless enough . One of the main themes of his "Belfast Address" was the elimination of anthropomorphism, from the interpretation of nature. Yet in describing Darwin's theory he says, "Can Nature thus select? Mr. Darwin's answer is 'Assuredly she can."' Tyndall (1889), II, 175.
95.2 "a competent judge" Darwin (1887), II, 153.
95.2 with deliberate ones. Cowles (1936), 343.
95.2 "the book twice". Darwin (1887), II, 346
95.3 "fittest under nature." See Ellegard (1958), 259.
96.1 "will be forgotten." Darwin (1872a), 58-9. See also Peckham (1959), 164.
96.1 what gravity is. Darwin (1887), II, 289-90.
97.1 in this essay. Since I have not, in fact, written this essay from the point of view of the nineteenth-century debate as conducted by philosophers, it would be pointless merely to list the relevant literature in a footnote. The issues which need careful study form a network of concepts which cut across writings in philosophy, science, theology, spiritualism, and literature. The main ones are "cause," "force," "power," "will," and "law." These were involved in an extended debate on the role of touch in learning and in knowledge of the external world, and those issues, in turn, were related to an anthropomorphic view of nature which stressed the active, sustaining role of the Deity. Some of the figures whose writings are relevant were W Whewell, W. Hamilton, J. S. Mill, A. Sedgwick, G. Combe, W Kirby, G. H. Lewes, A. R. Wallace, W B. Carpenter, and T. H. Huxley. Ellegard has touched on some of the issues (and refers to some of the relevant literature) in his article, Ellegard (1957), and chapter 9 of Ellegard (1958). Aspects of the debate which refer primarily to physiological psychology and the mind-body problem have been discussed, as I indicated above (76-7), in Smith (1970); cf Smith (1972 , 1973, 1977).
97.1 to this one. Crombie (1959). See also Lewes (1868), 359-60; Mivart (1888), especially 429.Huxley (1893), 1, chapters 4-5; II, chapter 5; VI, Part 2.
97.2 as an undergraduate, Darwin (1958a), 59; cf Darwin (1887), II, 219.
97.2 that of Paley. Darwin (1967), 201. It was common to refer to natural selection as "the principle of utility." Wallace seems to have become so accustomed to this
262
Notes to Pages 98-103
usage in evolutionary theory that he wrote, "The utilitarian hypothesis (which is the theory of natural selection applied to the mind)...." Wallace (1891), 199-200; cf above (73).
98.1 "though unrecognized, service." Quoted in Mandelbaum (1958), 378. Although Mandelbaum approaches the subject from the complementary perspective of Darwin's religious views, I have found this article extremely illuminating for the problem of Darwin's metaphor.
98.2 variations were preserved. The chapter in the Origin which Darwin rather hopefully calls "Laws of Variation" is a catalogue of questions and hypotheses, and its summary begins, "Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound." Darwin (1967), 167.
98.2 was too fragmentary. In his essay "On the Reception of the 'Origin of Species,' Huxley wrote, "In my earliest criticisms of the 'Origin' I ventured to point out that its logical foundation was insecure so long as experiments in selective breeding had not produced varieties which were more or less infertile; and that insecurity remains up to the present time"; Huxley (1887), 198. Darwin said of the geological record, "For my part following out Lyell's metaphor, I look at the natural geological record, as a history of the world imperfectly kept, written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or three countries. Of this volume only here and there a short chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines"; Darwin (1967), 311.
98.2 uniformity of nature. For example, the passage on the imperfections of the geological record just quoted (Darwin [1967], 311) concludes, "each word of the slowly-changing language, in which the history is supposed to be written, being more or less different in the interrupted succession of chapters, may represent the apparently abruptly changed forms of life, entombed in our consecutive, but widely separated, formations. On this view, the difficulties above discussed are greatly diminished, or even disappear" [ italics added]. Explicit appeals to the principle of the continuity of nature are made throughout the Origin (e. g., Darwin [1967], 194, 206, 210, 469); cf. above, pp. 88, 91, 94-5. In his review of the Origin for the Westminster Review in 1860, Huxley wrote, "And Mr. Darwin's position might, we think, have been even stronger than it is if he had not embarrassed himself with the aphorism, 'Natura non facit saltum,' which turns up so often in his pages"; Huxley (1893), II, 77. Huxley seems unaware that Darwin is using the aphorism in both a metaphysical and a scientific sense. Cf Darwin (1887), II, 233.
98.2 "with scientific thought." Tyndall (1889), II, 194.
99.3 "selector of varieties?" [Wilberforce] (1860), 237; cf. Darwin (1887), II, 321-3.
100.1 "to the other." Darwin and Wallace (1958), 277.
100.1 "and cultivated plants." Wallace (1889), vi.
100.1 "general naturalist public." Darwin and Seward (1903), 1, 267.
100.1 "evidently a stumbling-block." Darwin and Seward (1903), 267-8.
101.1 "of the fittest." Darwin and Seward (1903), I, 269, 268. The philosophical problems raised by the concepts of "survival" and "fittest" deserve further studies along lines similar to those adopted in the present essay.
101.2 "weaker and weaker." Darwin and Seward (1903), 1, 270-1.
101.2 "liable to Misconception." Wallace (1868), 144ff. See also [Wallace] (1869), 384.
101.3 "the selecting agent." Darwin (1887), II, 249; cf 298.
102.1 to include man. Lyell, (1830-33), I, 155-6, 163, 164.
102.1 "seems to explain." Darwin (1887), II, 210-11; cf Lyell (1881), II, 325-6.
103.1 "yourself to answer." Darwin and Seward (1903), I, 154.
103.1 "interest for me." Darwin and Seward (1903), I, 192-3.
103.1 "exaggerate their influence." Lyell (1863), 469.
103.1 man's special status. Lyell's continuing anguish over the special status of man is clear from his replies to Darwin's complaints that he had not gone far enough in the Antiquity of Man toward accepting evolution. See Lyell, (1881), II, 361-4, 376, 384-6.
263
Notes to Pages 104-112
104.2 "on Natural Selection." Darwin and Seward (1903), 1, 213.
104.2 of the Creator. The last two paragraphs of the Origin, along with the quotations in the frontispiece, provide clear evidence of Darwin's belief that his theory led to a grander view of the Creator. The same point of view had been expressed in numerous works before Darwin's, for example, by Charles Babbage, George Combe, Baden Powell, and Robert Chambers, not to mention the entire tradition of natural theology. It was but a small step from this position to the one held by Darwin's theistic interpreters. See also, chapter 1, pages 12-14.
105.1 "thus troubling you." de Beer (1959), 35; cf. Darwin (1887), 11, 241.
105.1 "other human being." de Beer (1959), 35.
106.2 his book appeared Darwin (1887), II, chapters 5-8, especially 243, 291-3, 354-5. Here is a very promising case study for a devout believer in scientific change by "paradigm shifts" as advocated by T. S. Kuhn (1962). However, if the argument of this essay is substantially correct, Kuhn should have a certain amount of difficulty in finding the paradigm from which and to which the shift occurs. Greene (1981), 30-59, takes the same view.
106.2 easy to accept. Campbell (1871); see also Ellegard (1958), 129ff.
106.2 "the loftier thought." Mandelbaum (1958), 368; Darwin (1887), II, 287-8.
106.2 "the Organic World." Carpenter (1888), 105-13 and chapters 6 and 12.-15; cf. Darwin (1887), II, 239-40, 262-3, 299. (Darwin complained somewhere in his life and letters that Carpenter could not "take the last bite.") [Richard Owen] wrote one of the main reviews of the Origin (1860). It was a very confusing argument, but Owen believed in a theory of "the continuous operation of the ordained becoming of living things." In his article "The Gospel of Evolution," Charles Elam calls this "one of the most philosophic phrases of modern times" (1880).
107.1 the point home. Lewes (1868); cf. Lewes (1867).
107.2 advocated "Evolutionary Teleology." Gray (1963).
107.2 written in 1860. See also Darwin (1887), II, 269-73, 286-7, 289, 296-7, 305-6.
108.1 "by this letter." Darwin (1887), II, 311-12.
108.1 "to each creature." Darwin (1887), II, 373; cf. 353 and Darwin and Seward (1903), 190-3. Darwin wrote to Lyell, "I must think that such views of Asa Gray and Herschel merely show that the subject in their minds is in Comte's theological stage of science" (192).
108.1 "foreseen or pre-ordained." Darwin (1887), II, 377-8.
109.1 "deal of nonsense." Darwin (1887), II, 382; cf. Mivart's attempt to make capital out of this admission in his review of The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin [Mivart] (1888), 436.
109.2 species by descent. Darwin (1887), II, 371; cf. 354 and III, 8-25, for other relevant passages on Lyell's Antiquity of Man and on Darwin's admission that he would be relatively content if the general doctrine of evolution could be accepted.
109.3 Animals under Domestication. Darwin (1887), III, 62.
109.3 to that statement. Darwin (1868), II, 430-2; Darwin (1958a), 87-8; cf. Romanes (1892-7), 1, 333ff.
110.1 evolution on design. [Mozley] (1869), 161ff., 172-6.
110.1 to Paley again. [Mozley] (1869), 172, 176.
110.2 "interest for me." See above p. 103.
110.2 of the Creator. See chapter 5.
111.1 "on the head." Darwin (1887), III, 189; cf. II, 387.
111.1 including human nature. Huxley (1874), especially 245; Tyndall (1889), especially 160n., 163-9, 195ff.
111.1 consolations of theism. Mill (1874), 125-257.
111.1 uniformity of nature. Nesbitt (1934).
111.1 "result of chance." Darwin (1887), 1, 315-17; cf. Darwin and Seward (1903), 1, 393-5; II, 171. I have written a bit more about this episode in Young (1971a).
112.1 "thus genuine atheism." Graham (1881), 344-5.
112.1 "'to go away."' Darwin (1887), 1, 316n.
112.2 historians of biology. Vorzimmer (1963); Beddall (1968); Geison (1969).
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Notes to Pages 113-119
113.1 a vera causa. This is another point of contact with the more straightforward literature of nineteenth-century philosophy. Darwin's mechanism revived questions about the concept of cause and force, as well as issues about the philosophies of science and of nature, which are associated with the writings of Whewell, Hamilton, and Mill. Cf. Darwin (1887), II, 289-90, along with the writings of Bain and Mivart; cf. Smith (1977).
113.1 on the topic. There are a number of qualifications of the following account which should be considered by anyone who is particularly interested in Darwin's attempts to make his mechanism more specific. See especially Vorzimmer (1963), 380-2, 387-90; Geison (1969), 377, 398ff., 404-9.
113.1 of incipient structures. For an excellent discussion of these problems in nineteenth-century terms, including a spirited defense of Darwin, see Romanes (1892-7), 1, 350-62; II, chapter 1.
113.1 a century earlier. Paley (1816), 58-63, 140-1, 157, 175-6, 240, 268-70, 369-79. See Elam (1880), 720-1.
113.1 Kingsley's Water Babies. Anon. (1863 a), 474-5.
113.2 man's higher faculties. Wallace (1891), chapters 7-9; Wallace (1889), chapter 15; Eiseley (1961), chapter II; Romanes (1892-7), I, 20-35.
114.1 the general public. [Wallace] (1869), 379-94.
114.1 man and society. Darwin (1887), III, 116-7; Young (1971a).
114.1 evolution of man. Wallace (1891), 188, 204. Wallace's spiritualist views grew more explicit in his later writings. See Smith (1972); Kottler (1974); Durant (1979).
114.2 Gray and Huxley.) This point is stressed by Vorzimmer (1963), 386.
114.2 North British Review. [jenkin] (1867).
114.2 reiterated Jenkin's arguments. Mivart (1871a); see also Gruber (1960).
114.2 number of generations. Jenkin (1867), 228-30.
114.2 of incipient structures. Mivart (1871a), 21-62; cf. Romanes (1892-7), I, 35off.
114.2 for evolutionary change. [Jenkin] (1867), 216-19; [Mivart] (1871a), 14-7.
115.1 been put forward. [Jenkin] (1867), 240-1; Geison (1969), 381ff.; Eiseley (1961), chapter 9.
115.2 "zoologist and botanist." [Huxley] (1893), II, 13.
115.2 "point of view." [Huxley] (1893), II, 74.
115.2 "and Hereditary Transmission." Lewes (1868), 356
115.3 an Omnipotent Designer. Paley (1816), chapter 3, especially 32.
116.1 "be considered real." Darwin (1967), 186-7; cf. Darwin (1887), II, 285 ("Baden Powell says he never read anything so conclusive as my statement about the eye!"). There were many objections to Darwin's presumption: [Mozley] (1869), 168; Mivart (1871a), 51; cf. Ellegard (1958), 247-8.
116.1 "makes me sick!" Darwin (1887), II, 296, cf. Mill (1874), 170-3.
116.1 "so confoundedly doubtful." [Mivart] (1888), 440.
116.1 "'of judging it."' Darwin (1887), III, 72, 75; Romanes (1892-7), II, 11. Geison suggests that Spencer's theory of use-inheritance may have strongly influenced Darwin's theory of Pangenesis. Geison (1969), 398ff.
117.1 "not long endure." Darwin (1872a), 395; Peckham (1959), 747-8.
118.1 "of a subject." Darwin (1874), v-vi.
118.1 "of Organic Evolution." Romanes (1892-7), II, 8.
118.2 "Ethics and Politics." Spencer (1898-9), 1, 650; cf 630, 690, 695. Spencer also says, "More than once I have pointed out that, as influencing men's views about Education, Ethics, Sociology, and Politics, the question whether acquired characters are inherited is the most important question before the scientific world." Spencer (1898-9), 1, 672; cf. above, pp. 48-52.
119.1 contrasted with Darwin's. It is noteworthy that Tyndall's "Belfast Address" contains lengthy expositions of the contributions of both Darwin and Spencer but makes no reference to theoretical differences between them on the mechanism of evolution. The works of Samuel Butler should also be consulted on the question of the mechanism and particularly on the changes in Darwin's views. Butler
265
Notes to Pages 119-130
made something of a career of celebrating the ambiguities involved in these questions.
119.1 "as the first." Peckham (1959), 9; cf. Romanes (1892-7), II, 2-5.
119.1 had even more. Peckham (1959), 20-4.
119.2 "'any one point."' Spencer (1898-9), 1, 651.
120.1 "long ago abandoned." Nordenskiöd (1928), 476.
120.1 natural selection alone. For expositions of the neo-Darwinian theory, see Huxley (1942); Simpson (1949); Smith (1958); Watson (1968).
120.1 next industrial revolution. Yoxen (1981, 1983).
120.2 evolution to man. Lyell (1863); Huxley (1959).
120.2 evolution in general. [Dawkins] (1871); [Mivart] (1871). See also [Mivart] (1888), 438ff., 443, 446.
120.2 "a new basis." Grant (1871), 275, 279.
121.1 need for design. Lewes (1868), 355.
121.1 "hidden from us." Hutton (1885), 196; Brown (1947). See chapter 5.
121.2 the popular press. Ellegard (1958), 24, 138, chapter 12.
121.2 "design in nature . . ." [Mivart] (1888), 437-8.
124.1 "may have wings." Disraeli (1847), I, 224-6.
124.2 "the public unagitated." Lewes (1867), 97; cf. 98, 99, 101, 104, 111.
124.1 "let nothing alone.". Eliot (1965), 39; cf. Haight (1968); Paris (1965); Kitchel (1943); Waddell (1976).
124.3 "sustained in narrative." Beer (1983), 196.
CHAPTER 5 Fragmentation of a common context
126.2 brain were conceived. Young (1966, 1968a), 1970).
126.2 man, and nature. Anon. (1833); [Brewster] (1834); [Scrope] (1836); [Brewster] (1837); Brock (1966).
128.1 of the century. See, for example [Jeffrey] (1803); Anon. (1809); Anon. (1813); [Whitaker] (1819); [Fitton] (1823); [Copleston] (1823); [Brougham] (1827); [Blunt] (1828); Anon. (1834); [Crombie] (1836); Anon. (1854); Cannon (1960, 1964).
128.2 and Quarterly Review? Ellegard (1957a); Cox (1960); Webb (1960).
130.1 in the period; Houghton (1957); Henkin (1963); Willey (1949, 1956); Knoep-flmacher (1965); Williams (1965); Hillis-Miller (1963); Buckley (1951, 1967); Haight (1968); Waddell (1976); Beer (1983).
130.1 geology and biology; Eiseley (1961); de Beer (1963); Gillispie (1959); Haber (1959); Merz (1896-1912).
130.1 religion and theology; Chadwick (1966-1970); Benn (1962); Robertson (1929); Hunt (1896); Elliott-Binns (1936); Elliott-Binns (1956); Jones (1968); Moore (1979).
130.1 history of philosophy; Passmore (1957); Metz (1938).
130.1 and related issues; Altick(1957);Webb (1955);Webb (1960);Cruse(1935).
130.1 own current understanding); Halévy (1952); Burrow (1966).
130.1 and historical context; Brinton (1933); Barker (1963); Burn (1965); Briggs (1959); Clark (1962); Hearnshaw (1967); Halévy (1961); Hamburger (1963, 1965); Thompson (1968); Murray (1929); Robson (1968); Hofstadter (1955); Young (1953).
130.1 the Victorian periodicals. Ribot (1873); Warren (1921); Boring (1950); Murphy (1949); Brett (1953); Temkin (1947); Hearnshaw (1964); Jefferson (1960).
130.2 on the other, Stocking (1968); Clive (1957, 1974); Shine and Shine (1949); Everett (1939).
130.3 the period 1820-50. Chadwick (1966-70), 1, chapter 8; Gillispie (1959).
130.3 Victorian intelligentsia did. I am not intending to be rude about Prof. Chadwick or Prof. Gillispie but to make a point about the complexity of the subject. Gillispie's is still among the best books on the subject, though now joined by Rudwick (1970) and Porter (1977), and was the inspiration of much of my own
266
Notes to Pages 131-141
research. However, his focus on the religious aspect involves a corresponding diminution of a sense of how much the readers of the periodicals knew about geology. See, for example, [Jeffrey] (1802); [Playfair] (1814); [Fitton] (1817); [Fleming] (1825); [Lyell] (1826); [Lyell] (1827); [Thompson] (1830); [Scrope] (1830, 1835); [Fitton] (1839); [Scrope] (1839); Anon. (1855); Anon. (1857a); [Condor] (1878); [Bunbury] (1882). Other reviewers of geological works are referred to in other parts of this essay. I have cited these reviews to emphasize my point. It could be driven home with a very long bibliography. See Houghton (1966), etc.
131.1 of the Victorians? Grisewood et al. (1966).
131.2 its own risks. Ellegard (1958).
131.2 Vestiges of Creation. Millhauser (1959).
132.1 much more important. Budd (1967), 110n.
132.1 place in it. Millhauser (1954).
133.2 write did read. See the works on literature cited above and Ward (1966).
133.2 Everett, or Haight. Kitchel (1933); Everett (1939); Haight (1968). This situation has begun to change in the wake of the work of Waddell (1966); cf. Beer (1983) and Shuttleworth (in press).
133.2 precise phrenological delineation. Cross (1885), 135-7, 259. In 1856, George Eliot wrote to a friend, "We are reading Gall's 'Anatomic et Physiologie du Cerveau,' and Carpenter's 'Comparative Physiology,' aloud in the evenings; and I am trying to fix some knowledge about plexuses and ganglia in my soft brain ...." (196). In 1844 Charles Bray persuaded her to have a phrenological cast made of her head. (Jefferson [1960], 41, cf. 40). See also Lewes (1857a) and the chapters on Gall in the second and third edition of Lewes (1857, 1867-71); Duncan (1908), 63-4, 42; Mineka (1963) for information on Mill's relationship with Lewes and Eliot; Ockenden (1940).
133.2 and biblical criticism. See Everett (1939), chapter 2; Kitchel (1933), passim. These matters are considered with great subtlety and in great detail in Waddell (1976). Her argument is based on the importance of the interrelations among these issues, so that each chapter is a vantage point from which to illuminate all of the others.
133.2 and philosophical works. See Everett (1939), chapters 3 and 4.
134.2 "of periodical literature." Brown (1947), 169.
134.3 begun in Britain. Brown (1947), 167, 168.
135.1 periodicals and tracts. Webb (1960), 206.
136.1 "idea of God." Burrow (1966), 169.
136.1 "reign of law." Quoted in Everett (1939), 80.
136.1 "its scientific conceptions." Everett (1939), 115-16.
136.1 almost every issue. Everett (1939), 106.
136.1 "of the miraculous . . ." Everett (1939), 115.
138.1 transcendental and intuitionist. Douglas (1882), 248; Todhunter (1876); Blake et al. (1960a); Strong (1955); Ellegard (1957); [Herschel] (1841); Robson (1964); Cannon (1964a).
138.2 "to natural theology." [Whewell] (1831), 194; [Whewell] (1832.).
138.3 most practicing geologists.) Cannon (1960a).
139.1 "course of nature." Whewell (1840), 1, 134.
139.1 beginning of things. Whewell (1840), I, 135, 137.
139.2 became increasingly abstract. Whewell (1840), I, 137-52.
140.1 "our material sciences." Whewell (1840), 1, 144-5; cf. Whewell (1837), III, 601-2.
140.2 Treatise in 1836. Buckland (1823); Buckland (1836), 94n.-95n.; [Scrope] (1836), 34n.
141.1 "such an alteration." Whewell (1840), II, 146-7.
141.1 "of true theology." Whewell (1837), III, 586.
141.1 "consistent with itself" Whewell (1840), II, 148.
141.1 "cannot gain anything." Whewell (1840), II, 150. cf 92-3.
267
Notes to Pages 142-146
142.1 of natural law. [Chambers] (1844); eleventh edition [Chambers] (1860). Chambers' authorship was acknowledged in a twelfth edition which appeared in 1884. Chambers(1884).
142.1 in evolutionary terms. Spencer (1852, 1855).
142.2 in scientific terms, Anon. (1857); Anon. (1864a); Cruse (1935), chapter 5.
142.2 to complement Whewell's). Sedgwick successively opposes Lyell, Chambers, and Darwin. [Sedgwick] (1845); Sedgwick (1850), where he attacks the Vestiges, phrenology, German historiography, Tract XC, Utilitarian Morals, and Lockean sensationalism; cf above, p. 6; Clark and Hughes (1890).
142.2 mentioning the book! Whewell (1845).
142.2 they enrage scientists. Douglas (1882), 316-9. Chambers' book did enrage scientists. His "facts" were usually wrong; he confused the concept of law with that of cause, infuriated Herschel and Huxley, and convinced Darwin not to base his own argument on the geological evidence. Nevertheless, Chambers grasped the general idea that all of nature (including humanity and society) is under the domain of law, more clearly than his more cautious and scientifically respectable contemporaries.
143.1 action, we fail. Whewell (1846), 6-9; cf 43-4.
143.2 the most credulous. Whewell (1846), 20-1.
143.2 "lesson of humility." Whewell (1846), 21-4.
144.1 are conscious automata. Tyndall (1889), especially 200; cf 202-50. (The separately printed version of the Belfast Address - London [1874] - was modified after the protest evoked by the original version, but Tyndall restored the omissions in his Fragments after being criticized for modifying the printed version.) Huxley (1874), especially 236-44; Brown (1947), 231-8.
144.1 International Scientific Series. Draper (1875); cf Draper (1909). It was this argument which was being put at Oxford when the famous Huxley-Wilberforce confrontation occurred. Lucas (1979), 313-14. Tyndall used the published version as a major source for the argument of his Belfast Address. Draper claimed to have originated the historiographic thesis of scientific determinism - progressing from darkness to light. Although this claim would have amused the Positivists, among others, it represented a new awareness of the relationship between religion and science as one of conflict, with science progressively advancing, as religion retreats. For further information on the thesis and on the Oxford meeting, see Fleming (1950), chapter 7; Anon. (1864, 1865); Moore (1979), chapter 1; cf. 61ff.
144.1 efficacy of prayer. Galton (1872). Tyndall initiated this bit of coat-trailing in the Contemporary Review in July, 1872, where he suggested controlled experiments in hospitals - praying for some patients and not for others. See Brown (1947), 177-80. For an earlier, theological, point of view, see Ward (1867).
144.2 "horrified with us." Darwin (1887), II, 261, 261n. During his undergraduate days at Cambridge, Darwin had met Whewell. See Darwin (1958a), 66, 104.
145.1 the contemporary controversy. Todhunter (1876), II, 433-5.
145.2 Place in Nature. Lyell (1863); Anon. (1863); Huxley (1959), an edition which restores omissions from the version in his collected essays.
145.2 do so soon. Todhunter (1876), II, 435-6.
146.1 of Trinity College. Darwin (1887), II, 261n.
146.2 Origin of Species, [Owen] (1860), especially 487 and 532; Carpenter (1860, 1860a).
146.2 1860 than Darwin's. Temple et al. (1860); [Harrison] (1860); [Wilberforce] (1861); [Stanley] (1861); Anon. (1862); Willey (1956), chapters 4 and 6; Anon, (1862a); Thomson (1862). There is a collection of replies and tracts on Essays and Reviews in the Cambridge University Library (class marks 8.33.31, 8.33.34-6, 8.33.45). M. A. Worden of Sommerville College Oxford, has written a doctoral dissertation on conflicts over religious inquiries among the Anglican clergy in the 1860s. Cf. Appleman et al. (1959), part 1. Michael Wolff's essay on Victorian reviewers and cultural responsibility is the best treatment of the issues raised in this essay which I have seen (267-89).
268
Notes to Pages 146-152
146.2 of the Origin. Peckham (1959), 69. de Beer (1959), 51-4. Darwin wrote, "Permit me to add that I read your Philosophy of Creation with great interest: it struck me as excellently and vigorously argued and written with a clearness, which I remember excited my warmest admiration" (53). Darwin had also acknowledged Powell in the preface of his great work, Natural Selection, which remained unpublished during his lifetime. de Beer (1959), 54; Stauffer (1975).
146.2 from the other Powell (1833, 1838, 1839, 1855 [second edition entitled The Unity of Worlds and of Nature, 1856], 1857, 1859). [Mann] (1855); Anon. (1859, 1860, 1860a). For a biographical account of Powell, see Tuckwell (1909), chapter 7. There are fifteen tracts and essays aimed exclusively or largely at Powell in the Cambridge University Library collection; cf. Ellegard (1958), 112, 158.
147.1 faith and reason. Powell (1838), 237-56, 297-301.
147.1 "upon fallacious principles." Powell (1860), 440.
147.1 insisted, entirely separate. Powell (1838), 229, 231, 268-9.
147.2 doctrine of Vestiges. See the introduction to the privately printed edition of The Constitution of Man, Edinburgh (1827); later Henderson Trust edition (1841), etc., 20, and chapter 5; 12th edition (1884), 405; see also letters to Combe and from Powell, xxx-xxxi; Clarke and Hughes (1890), II, 83-4.
147.2 by Darwin's book. Barlow (1967), 206; Darwin (1887), II, 247-50.
147.2 stand and fight. [Wilberforce] (1860), especially 258-60. I am indebted to Prof. Sidney Eisen, who has helped me to see the merits of Wilberforce's position by contrasting it with Charles Kingsley's attempts to ingratiate himself with the evolutionists. Wilberforce's point of view is also defended by Lucas (1979).
147.2 on this assumption. Powell (1860), 354-5.
148.1 "book of Genesis." Huxley (1887), 202-3.
148.1 are conscious automata. Huxley (1874), 236-8, 244.
148.1 of a phenomenon. Lyell in Darwin (1887), II, 193n.; cf Huxley's comments (192-3); Powell (1855), 118-9, 439; Powell (1860), 139; R. Owen in British Association Reports for 1858, xc.
148.1 Origin of Species. Mandelbaum (1958).
148.1 the orderly sequence. Babbage (1837), 92-9, 191 and chapters 10-13.
148.1 no empirical reference. Chambers used Babbage's argument in an attempt to settle religious doubts about his evolutionary theory. Chambers (1884), 203-11.
149.1 Archbishop of Canterbury. Temple (1884), 188; Anon. (1885); [Mivart] (1885); Temple (1860); Elliott-Binns (1956), 25. It is worth recalling that both Lyell (died 1875) and Darwin (died 1882) were buried in Westminster Abbey. However accomodating the Abbey is to deviants, it certainly knows how to register someone's role in British culture.
149.2 "to their hands." Ray (1709), 47.
149.2 do with origins. Paley (1816), chapters 1-5, 239-40, 265, 268, 308-10, 361, 373-5; cf [Blunt] (1828), 312-13, where Paley is praised for his simple examples and his avoidance of technical language.
149.2 to some degree); See the Bridgewater Treatises of Kirby (1835) and Chalmers (1833), where liberties are taken with the Hebrew language and with the days of the Creation.
151.2 study of it. Brown (1947), appendix A (membership list).
151.2 lives and letters. Brown (1947), appendix C: the papers of the Metaphysical Society. There are more or less complete sets of these papers at the Bodlean and Manchester College libraries, Oxford.
151.2 "A Modern Symposium." Stephen et al. (1877-78).
151.2 a typical meeting. H. E. Manning, "A Diagnosis and a Prescription" (no. 36, 10 June 1873); Mark Pattison, "Double Truth" (no. 74, 12 February 1878); M. Bolton, "Has the Metaphysical Society any raison d'être?" (no. 75, 9 April 1878); Hutton (1885).
151.2 by natural selection. [Wallace] (1869), especially 379-96.
151.3 interest- in 1880. Brown (1947), appendix D.
152.1 "conscience, and materialism." Brown (1947), chapters 1-3, especially 21-2, 26.
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Notes of Pages 152-157
152.1 "it not He?" Brown (1947), 42-3.
152.1"Uniformity of Nature?" Hutton (1885), 180. W G. Ward did give a paper under this title, "The Metaphysical Society A Reminiscence" (no. 30, to December 1872), and the topic - as my hypothesis requires - was the most common theme in the Society's deliberations. Toward the end of the series Leslie Stephen also gave a paper entitled "The Uniformity of Nature" (no. 82, 11 March 1879).
152.1 kind were heard. Brown (1947), 29.
152.2 the term "metaphysics." Tennyson (1897), II, 170.
153.2 the last year), Brown (1947), 250n.-251n.
153.3 Martineau, Tennyson, and Ruskin. Brown (1947), 169-70.
154.1 of the century. Brown (1947), 168.
154.1 2,500 in 1873. Brown (1947), passim; Ellegard (1957a), 27-8, 32-4.
154.2 more diversified interests. Dallas (1859); cf in the same volume of Blackwood's, pp. 180-95, 515-32; and 86: 681-9.
155.1 find any figures. Brown (1947), chapters 9-10.
155.3 "an ocean voyage." Howarth (1931), 252.
156.3 study of popularizations. It is important to make a distinction between two sorts of popularizers. The first group consists of professional scientists and philosophers writing for a popular audience, e.g., Huxley's essays (1893); Huxley's Lay Sermons first appeared in 1870 and went through thirteen reprintings by 1903; Tyndall (1889); Mivart (1874-80, 1892,); Spencer (1901); Wallace (1900). See also the writings of Carpenter (1888), Lewes (essays never collected), and Romanes (1897). For an example of the new sort of popularization of science, see Anon. (1878), which unmistakably conveys that the most eminent popularizers of science are now advising a new, more journalistic writer: "Prof. Huxley has kindly read, and aided the Compilers and the Editor with his advice upon, the following article" (755).
The writers who come into increasing prominence in the late 1860s are not always professionally qualified in science but are attempting to interpret its implications and consider its applications in ethics, politics, history, and social theory. The International Scientific Series is interesting because it embraces both groups. Some ofthe works which seem to me to represent the growing significance of this sort of writing are Clifford (1879, 1885); Campbell (1871, 1880-1); Bagehot (1869); Hutton (1899, 1894); Butler (1878, 1879, 1880, 1887); Buckle (1857-61); Lecky (1865), with nineteen editions and reprints by 1910; Lecky (1899) (Buckle and Lecky are symptomatic of the development of the naturalist, determinist historiography); Stephen (1873, 1882, 1893); LeConte (1893); Kidd (1894), with eleven editions and reprints by 1898; Watson (1895); Mackintosh (1899). Many of these works are collections of essays from Victorian periodicals. The list ofworks in this (putative) genre could be extended indefinitely. I have cited ones which I happen to have consulted. See also the following essays: Hannah (1868, 1869); Farrar (1868); [Mozley] (1869); Grant (1871), Martineau (1872, 1876); Elam (1880).
It is difficult in this period to draw lines between different philosophical positions by means of attitudes toward the uniformity of nature. As I have suggested, the principle had become so vague as to embrace positions extending all the way from belief in miracles to orthodox Comtism and beyond. An important desideratum in late-Victorian studies is to establish some sort of classification of theories. A series of papers by Sydney Eisen helps to chart one network of relations with respect to Comtism: Eisen (1964, 1967, 1967a, 1968). See also Simon (1963), chapters 7-8.
157.1 the scientific scene.) There is a short discussion of The International Scientific Series in Fleming (1950); Becker (1874) is a rather chatty treatment ofthe institutional aspect of science in London.
157.2 "and moral nihilism." Graham (1884), Preface; cf. Crone (1937), 80.
157.2 the modern reader. Coupland (1881), 568, 572.
157.2 International Scientific Series. Anon. (1882). Graham's other works are Idealism,
.
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Notes to Pages 158
An Essay Metaphysical and Critical (1872); The Social Problem in its Economical, Moral, and Political Aspects (1886); Socialism, Old and New (1890) International Scientific Series; English Political Philosophy from Hobbes to Maine (1899); Free Trade and the Empire: A Study in Economics and Politics (1904). Cf. Young (1971a).
158.1 been renamed Man. Penniman (1965), 91; Stocking (1971). The relevant historical study is Keith (1917).
158.2 in the quarterlies. [Brown] (1803); [Gordon] (1815). This article brought Spurzheim to Edinburgh and led to George Combe's conversion and to the establishment of the phrenological movement in Britain. Numerous societies, the Phrenological Journal and successors until 1966, and the role of phrenology in the development of naturalism, education, and various reform movements, as well as its influence on Chambers, Spencer, Lewes, Wallace, and other figures all deserve further study. An important beginning has been made by Cooter (1978); [Jeffrey] (1826); [Chevenix] (1828); Jefferson (1960a); see the articles on phrenology in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 8th-11th editions (the changes are note-worthy). Combe's Constitution of Man (1828, 1835, 1866) was not reviewed in the major periodicals, although it sold 85,000 copies in Britain by 1850 (Leader, vol. I, [1850], 24); cf Wallace (1901a) on the neglect of phrenology. Some of Combe's later works and his biography were noticed in the periodicals.
The first edition of Spencer's Principles of Psychology (1855) was not widely reviewed. Lewes and J. D. Morell did help out a friend and noticed it, while R. H. Hutton discussed it under the title "Modern Atheism," but Spencer's works did not receive much critical attention until the Synthetic Philosophy was well under way; Spencer (1904), 1, 468-72. See, e.g., [Mivart] (1873); Mivart (1874-80, 1880). When Spencer's Autobiography (1904) and his Life and Letters (1908) appeared, he received the full treatment in the Edinburgh, Contemporary, and Fortnightly. For recent discussions see Peel (1971); Kennedy (1978); Bannister (1979). There remains room for a full biographical study of Spencer which places him and his work in their time and draws on a wide reading of the literature about him as well as his relationships, e.g., with Lewes, George Eliot, his American promoters, and the wide current of nineteenth-century naturalism. He was as pervasive in the decades in which he flourished as a Malthus or a Chambers was in his own. One aspect of this has been explored with respect to Spencer and George Eliot; see Waddell (1976), chapter 2.
A third leading contributor to psychology in the period was Alexander Bain. The first volume of his major work - The Senses and The Intellect (1855) - was not reviewed and lost money. He had trouble getting the second volume published. J. S. Mill and George Grote guaranteed £100 against loss by the publishers. When The Emotion and The Wtll (1859) appeared, Mill helped it along with a laudatory review; [Mill] (1859). The two volumes went through four editions by the turn of the century, and some of Bain's other works were very popular and influential. However, they were hardly noticed in the general periodicals. For further discussion of his psychology and its influence, see Young (1968); Young (1970), chapter 3.
It might be worthwhile to make a detailed comparison of the sales of psychological works with their treatment in the periodical press in the period. The works themselves reveal a network of ideas including phrenology, mesmerism, positivism, associationism, utilitarianism, physiology (and later) evolutionism, anthropology, and agnosticism. A good example of this in the earlier period is Atkinson and Martineau (1851); cf. Kitchel (1933), 79-80. In the post-1859 period, representative works are Spencer (1870-2); Lewes (1877).
158.2 major evolutionary works. [Sedgwick] (1845), 11-12, 63-4; [Wilberforce](1860), 258; [Mivart] (1871), 89-90; [Dawkins] (1871), 195-6, 200, 207-8; [Baynes] (1872), 113-15, 117-18.
158.2 Brown, J. Mill, J. S. Mill. These developments are discussed in detail in Young (1970), 94-100 and chapters 3-9.
158.3 included these remarks: see also above p. 65
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Notes to Pages 159-165
159.1 "standing of psychology." Robertson (1876).
159.1 by natural theology. Chalmers (1833); cf. Anon. (1833), 4-5.
159.1 the Metaphysical Society. Brown (1947), 197-206.
159.1 on its council. Kitchel (1933), 276-7; cf. 217. We need to know much more about the Philosophical Club, the X Club and The Club. See Huxley (1900), II, 255-61; MacLeod (1970); Jensen (1970).
159.2 vein in 1890-1. Brown (1947), 247-52.
160.1 of the century. Brown (1947), chapters 9 and 10.
160.2 the "Sympathetic Society." Brown (1947), 252-60.
161.1 "philosophers, and theologians." Quoted in Brown (1947), 106.
161.3 "of course, completely lulled." Huxley (1889), 237-9.
162.1 "prominent unifying role" Brooke (1979), 39-40.
162.1 "to its fragmentation" Brooke (1977), 284, 285.
162.1 "of natural theology" Brooke (1977), 283.
162.1 "of scientific naturalism." Brooke (1977), 283.
162.2 "religious periodical press." Brooke (1977), 278.
162.2 "the scientific apologists." Brooke (1977), 227n.
CHAPTER 6 Man's place in nature
164.1 Joseph Needham (1935). Needham (1943), 141.
164.1 theory and praxis. For a discussion of "The Marxian Concept of Praxis," see Lefebvre (1968a). A more concise exposition of the relationship between thought and action occurs at pages 231-5 in Taylor's excellent discussion "Marxism and Empiricism." Taylor (1966).
164.2 "History of Embryology." Needham (1943), 141-59.
164.2 in his honor Teich and Young (1973).
165.1 science in Britain. Bukharin et al, (1971). For discussions of the relationship between this event and later manifestations of the radical science movement, see Radical Science Journal Collective (1981); Rosenhead et al, (1982); including Young (1982b). The best study of the earlier movement is Werskey (1978); he also considers the relationship between the two periods in Werskey (1975).
165.1 meant by "radical." In other branches of historical studies this revival of socialist approaches to scholarship has been under way for some time. In the fields of philosophy and history see, for example, New Left Review, Telos, Radical Philosophy, Radical History Review, History Workshop Journal. In other disciplines there have been similar journals which developed through the 1970s into a radical sub-culture. See, for example, Radical America (especially vol. 4, nos. 8-9 [Nov.1970]: "special issue on Radical Historiography"), Feminist Review, Insurgent Sociologist, Capital and Class, Psychology and Social Theory, Processed World, New German Critique, among many others. See also Fischer (1971), especially preface on radical scholarship; Roszak (1970); Chomsky (1969). In the ensuing decades works of this sort became common.
165.1 alienating and repressive. In this context, a "critical" approach explicitly includes the use of evaluation both in the definition of the domain and in the analysis of the "data." The relevant values are emancipatory, and describe "the human potentiality for self-reflection and self-determination, that is not yet fully realised and is continuously hindered by the present modes of production." This conception has been worked out by the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. See Schroyer (1970), 209. When I first showed a draft of this essay to colleagues, I was surprised by the extreme reaction of some scholars to it. Some implied that scholarship is - or can be - neutral and objective. Others seemed unwilling or unable to grasp that there is a long tradition of philosophy, scholarship, and political activism which does not acknowledge that the "fact - value" distinction can operate with any precision or, rather, that it operates in quite precise ways in the service of any given interest group's need to draw the line at a certain point. Similarly, there is an established and growing tradition of writers
272
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who explicitly draw on evaluative conceptions of how they would like the world to be, to provide a standpoint for criticizing how it is, and has been. Those who deny that they are doing this tend, on the whole, to be prepared to live with the world as it is.
167.1 service of liberation. Most scholars find it very difficult indeed to make any contact at all with Marxist historiography. They are thereby precluded from giving serious consideration to its approach. I found the following works helpful in attempting to relate the assumptions of traditional historiography with those of Marxism. On the social determination of truth and the sociology of knowledge, see Mannheim (1954); Berger and Luckman (1966); Curtis and Petras (1970) includes extensive bibliography. Further references are given in the notes at the end of Young (1971); for reading lists on Marxism and science and related issues see Radical Science Journal Collective (1978); see also Young (1977c); Radical Science Journal Collective (1981); Young (1981, 1982a). For a criticism of the assumptions of the sociology of knowledge, see Lukes, "On the Social Determination of Truth" (in Lukes 1972). For expositions of Marxism which are accessible to scholars trained in the Anglo-American empiricist tradition, see Taylor (1966); Lefebvre (1966); UNESCO (1969), especially essays by Hobsbawm, Frankel, and Markovic. A most helpful exposition is Ollman (1971); cf an illuminating review of this book in which the difficulties of Anglo-American scholars are spelled out: Heilbroner (1972).
167.3 on the other. Young (1966, 1967, 1967a, 1967b, 1970, 1968a, 1971a, 1968).
168.1 were being established. See, for example, the contributions of Charles Webster and P. M. Rattansi as compared with that of M. B. Hesse, in Teich and Young (1973). Hesse develops these points further in Hesse (1980).
170.1 the ongoing debate. Houghton (1966), etc., has dramatically lessened the problems of anonymous authorship. Scholars working on these sources also benefit from one another's research through the Victorian Periodicals Newsletter.
170.1 its own organs. This research was conducted in conjunction with a Special Subject in Part II of the Cambridge Historical Tripes (1966-70), "Science and Public Debate in Britain, 1830-76." Both the scope of, and the approach to, the research were significantly influenced by working on the same documents with undergraduates in history and in the natural sciences.
170.1 reasons for this. This problem is discussed in chapter 3.
170.1 and political activists. Analogies between the debates in the nineteenth century and in the current period are discussed in Young (1971); cf Young (1977, 1977a, 1977b, 1981).
171.2 "determines their consciousness." Marx (1971), 20-1.
171.2 philosophical themes, e.g., N. R. Hanson, (1958).
171.2 Augustine to Galileo. Crombie (1959a).
172.1 apparently straightforward statement. See, for example, Hoskin (1963); Hesse (1961, 1963, 1973, 1980), in which I am glad to say that this essay is spoken of in complimentary terms in spite of the political and moral gulf between us; Buchdahl (1963, 1969, 1973). Buchdahl's important monograph appeared at the end of the decade, embracing issues which had been discussed in his seminars at least since 1960.
172.1 the prevailing orthodoxy.) Butterfield (1957); Hall (1954, 1960); Gillispie (1960).
172.1 the established tradition. Boas (1962); Hall (1963). Their joint synoptic volume was not widely available in Britain: Boas and Hall (1964).
172.2 history of science. Kuhn (1957) was a standard source before his historiographic thesis appeared: Kuhn (1962); postscript (1970); Buchdahl (1965); Shapere (1964); Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) includes opening and concluding chapters by Kuhn; cf Bloor (1971); a recent collection is Gutting (1980)
172.2 latter in translation). Hesse (1961); Dijksterhuis (1961).
172.2 appeared in 1960. Blake, Ducasse, and Madden (1960).
172.2 English translation, 1959). Braithwaite (1960); Popper (1959); a collection of Popper's papers appeared four years later: Popper (1963), dedicated to the conservative economist F. A. von Hayek.
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Notes to Pages 172-177
172.2 for all knowledge. The most widely used of these were Feigl and Brodbeck (1953); Wiener (1953); Madden (1960). A collection of the essays of Ernest Nagel appeared in the same period: Nagel (1961), as did the analytic treatise of Arthur Pap (1963). I shall never forget the occasion when my undergraduate supervisor, Nathaniel Lawrence, introduced me to Arthur Pap when we bumped into him on a walk in New Haven. "Hello, Arthur; lovely day." "I presume you are speaking metaphorically," said Pap, apparently rather positivistically taken aback by Lawrence's loose speaking. I cannot say at this distance whether there was a twinkle in his eye, but I do recall this as my introduction to orthodoxy in the philosophy of science.
172.3 and political contexts. A survey of the domain of the history of science was made at a symposium at Oxford in 1961: Crombie (1963). The scope of this overview was far broader than the teaching programs in British and American universities. In particular, economic and social issues were not emphasized. The only readily available Marxist survey of the history of science was not widely read or discussed in teaching programs: Mason (1962). Mason returned to research in chemistry when no posts were available to him in the history of science. His survey is, in my opinion, very useful and incisive.
173.1 of Alexander Koyré. Whitehead (1925); Burtt (1932); Lovejoy (1960) - these three remain the noblest books in my (pre-Marxist) pantheon. Cf Koyré (1965, 1968).
173.2 Civilisation in China. Needham et al, (1954-).
173.2 History of Embryology, Needham (1959).
173.3 seldom referred to. For recent reconsiderations of what came to be known as "Bernalism," see Werskey (1978); Young (1980a); Rosenhead et al. (1982).
174.2 "determines social forms." Hall (1963a), 10. In spite of rather a lot of significant work which made his earlier position increasingly eccentric, Hall remained un-repentant a decade later. See Hall (1974). For a selective review of that recent work see Shapin (1982) which, in my view, culpably omits the names Cooter, Jordanova, Figlio, J. Moore, E. Yoxen, D. Haraway. The centrists seem to continue to find their relationship to politically subversive ideas by simply omitting to mention their authors, no matter how, in some cases, distinguished the work is.
174.2 from externalise explanations. Hall (1963a).
174.2 "an intellectual tradition." Hall (1963a), 12.
174.2 "even experimental science." Hall (1963a), 13-14.
175.1 "their interpretive capacity." Hall (1963a), 13.
176.1 of modern science. Rattansi (1963, 1964, 1968, 1973); McGuire and Rattansi (1966); McGuire (1967, 1968, 1968a, 1970); Webster (1966, 1967, 1967a). What he was incubating was a near-classic: Webster (1975); if only it were a little less allusive, it would be accessible to a very wide audience instead of restricted to the cognoscenti.
176.2 elaborate historical punning. Dunn (1967, 1968, 1969); Skinner (1966, 1966a, 1969, 1969a); Skinner's interests in the sociology of knowledge and philosophy have since led him to be preoccupied with the philosophical analysis of the concept of action, as well as the history of political theory, while Dunn has become a conceptual analyst of modem political phenomena. See Skinner (1971, 1979); Dunn (1972, 1979). Both continue to operate in both historical and philosophical circles and to remain politically aloof
176.2 nineteenth-century intellectual history. Burrow (1966). I have commented on this book; Young (1967c). See also his lucid introduction to the Pelican reprint of the first edition of On the Origin of Species, Burrow (1969).
177.2 of historical studies. Those who attended the seminar more or less regularly were D. P. Walker, G. Buchdahl, M. Teich, M. B. Hesse, G. W Stocking, Jr., W Thomas, J. W Burrow, C. Webster, M. J. S. Rudwick, Q. R. D. Skinner, H. Fruchtbaum, R. MacLeod, G. Sutherland, S. Budd, R. Porter, P. M. Rattansi, R. M. Young.
177.3 of Eric Hobsbawm, E. H. Carr, E. H. Carr's Trevelyan Lectures on Historiog-
274
Notes to Pages 178-186
raphy were published in 1961 and appeared on undergraduate reading lists in the history of science. I do not, however, recall ever having heard them discussed among senior members. Carr (1964).
178.1 English-speaking readers. Foucault (1970).
178.2 about America's Future. Williams (1968); cf the discussion of Williams' work in Radical America, vol. 4, nos. 8-9 (Nov. 1970), 1, 74, 76, 82-3, 92-3, 96, 104; and ibid., vol. 4 no. 6 (August 1970), 29-53. Williams is certainly the most distinguished Marxist-influenced historian of the older generation in America. For a longer, although not wholly satisfactory, perspective on the relationship between social thought and Marxism, see Zeitlin (1968).
179.3 (and remains) nonpareil, Smith (1960).
179.3 history of biology. de Beer (1959, 1959a, 1960-1, 1961-2,, 1963, 1968); de Beer et al. (1967).
180.1 "devoid of foundation." de Beer (1963), 100; cf. 95-9.
181.1 de Beer's new evidence. See above, chapter 2; Vorzimmer (1969); Herbert (1971); Kohn (1980).
181.1 "animals in nature." de Beer (1970), 33.
181.1 his codiscoverer A. R. Wallace. See above pp. 39-48.
181.2 and political ones. Ellegard (1958).
182.1 demography, and methodology. Geison (1969); French (1970); Egerton (1968); Ruse (1971).
182.1 situation remains true.) I assert this on the basis of my own (incomplete) subsequent reading of the literature, coupled with attendance at the Darwinian Heritage Conference in Florence in 1982, as well as discussion with younger scholars who have followed the literature closely, e.g., Durant (in press), Moore (in press). If I attempted to list subsequent research, there would be unmerited omissions.
182.2 Wilson, Herbert, and Porter. Cannon (1960a, 1961a); Hooykaas (1957, 1963, 1966); Haber (1959); Coleman (1962); Wilson (1967, 1970, 1971), along with his later writings, which I have not read. Herbert (1974, 1977), along with subsequent works of hers which I have not read); Porter (1973, 1977); Jordanova and Porter (1979).
182.2 in the period. Rudwick (1963, 1967, 1969, 1969a, 1970, 1971, 1972).
182.3 of the box. Eisley (1961).
183.1 the physicochemical sciences. Gillispie (1959).
183.1 their contemporary context. Greene (1961); cf Greene (1975, 1981).
183.2 Chambers and "Vestiges." Millhauser (1959). In his introduction to the facsimile reprint of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, Sir Gavin de Beer (1969) utterly fails to convey the contemporary significance of Chambers' book.
183.2 "The Scriptural Geologists," Millhauser (1954).
183.2 was made public. Lyell's treatment of evolution was in a negative sense and in another context ~ that of geological dating. Spencer's evolutionary speculations were not widely known.
184.1 "of analogous views." Darwin (1872a), xvii.
184.1 views on evolution. Young (1971a); above, pp. 44-8, 88-92, 99-101, 113-4, 118-20; Smith (1972); Durant (1979); Kottler (1974).
184.2 prepared to allow. See above, chapter 4; Young (1967a); Young (in press); Durant (1982).
185.1 Victorian Social Theory. Burrow (1966).
185.1 of a Sociologist. Peel (1971).
186.1 Industry and Empire. Thompson (1968); Hobsbawm (1969).
186.2 in their accounts. It would be tedious and pointless to list the standard works on Victorian history from G. M. Young to the present, which do not include any serious considerations of science and its ideology. Two recent works are typical. In J. F. C. Harrison's The Early Victorians, 1832-51 (1971), there are no index entries for "geology," "Lyell," or "science." In the subsequent volume in the same series, Mid- Victorian Britain, 1851-75 (1971), by Geoffrey Best, there are no entries for "evolution" or "science." Two references to Darwinism are fleeting
275
Notes to Pages 186-189
and indirect. Harrison treats Malthusianism at length but neither he nor Best considers its reinforcement by biological theory, thereby providing more forceful rationalization for its social ideology. By contrast, histories of the Victorian period written in the nineteenth century and up to about 1930 devote careful and detailed attention to evolutionism and related issues. Current literary historians are much more sensitive to the role of science. See especially, Waddell (1976); Beer (1983).
186.2 been sorely neglected. Arnold W Thackray has begun to raise some of the relevant issues from the point of view of liberal, functionalist scholarship in Thackray (1970), 76-80. He has gone on to make a good career out of concensus historical sociology of science. See below, note to p. 231. 1.
187.1 became impossibly complicated. See chapter 2.
187.1 to a consensus. I have discussed some of these issues in the discursive notes to Young (1971); cf. Young (1972).
187.2 "and vegetable kingdoms." Darwin (1967), 5.
188.1 unlimited social progress. [Malthus] (1798); Flew (1970); Levin (1966).
188.1 production of wealth. Halévy (1952), 225-48.
188.1 still with us. Grisewood et al. (1966), 73, 74. See also essays and bibliographies in Glass (1953).
188.1 The Malthusian Controversy- Smith (1951).
188.2 for the indigent. Banks and Glass (1953); cf. Nesbitt (1934), 58-9., Sewell (1962); Poynter (1969).
188.2 Ardrey and Darlington. Bowen (1879); George (1962); Thomas (1983), Young (1971a, 1973).
188.2 "they are now." Malthus (1970), 207.
188.2 even sterner language. See above, pp. 32-9.
189.1 polemics against Malthus Examples: Marx to Engles, 18 June 1862: "It is remarkable how Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his English society with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, 'inventions,'and the Malthusian'struggle for existence.' Marx and Engels (1965), 128. Engels: "Darwin did not know what a bitter satire he wrote on mankind, and especially on his countrymen, when he showed that free competition, the struggle for existence, which the economists celebrate as the highest historical achievement, is the normal state of the animal kingdom. Only conscious organisation of social production, in which production and distribution are carried on in a planned way, can lift mankind above the rest of the animal world as regards the social aspect, in the same way that production in general has done this for mankind in the specifically biological aspect." Engels (1964), 35-6. Engels to Lavrov, 12-17 November 1875: "The whole Darwinist teaching of the struggle for existence is simply a transference from society to nature of Hobbes's doctrine of bellum omnium contra omnes and of the bourgois-economic doctrine of competition, together with Malthus' theory of population. When this conjurer's trick has been performed (and I question its absolute permissibility . . . particularly as far as the Malthusian theory is concerned), the same theories are transferred back again from organic nature to history and it is now claimed that their validity as eternal laws of human society has been proved. The puerility of this procedure is so obvious that not a word need be said about it." Marx and Engels (1965), 302; cf. 301-4 and Engels (1964), 312-14 and below, notes to p. 200.
189.1 a just one. Fyfe (1951); Bernal (1952-3); Meek (1954a); Meek (1954); Douglas (1975), where the pervasiveness of Malthusianism is touched upon; cf. Chase (1980), especially chapters 4 and 5 for continuity between past and present versions of scarcity conservatism.
189.2 he had retained. See above, pp. 30, 97-8.
189.2 implies a watchmaker. Paley (1816), chapters 1-3.
189.2 Newtonian Heavenly Clockmaker. Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise (1836) was of a higher standard of scientific reputability than the other works in the series, and
276
Notes to Pages 190-199
its efforts to reconcile the evidence of geology with Scripture were relatively sophisticated. See above pp. 6-7 and the rest of that chapter for consideration of the levels of debate on geology and theology.
190.1 and social thought. Albee (1962), chapter 9.
190.1 to Malthus' theory. See above pp. 27-31, 54-5.
190.2 "very little reason." Paley (1816), 434.
190.2 "the condition itself. " Paley (1792), 318.
190.2 "happy without them." Paley (1792), 320.
190.2 "have adopted it." Paley (1792), 324.
191.1 the current orthodoxy. Durkheim (1962, 1964); Coker (1967); Barnes (1925); Russett (1966); Salz (1930-5); Young (1972a, 1981).
191.2 the existing order. Roy Porter points out that throughout this essay the achievements of the bourgeois revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are ignored, a mistake which Marx never made. I am aware that in stressing a continuous tradition of rationlizing and reconciling literature and in attempting to draw attention to some fundamental continuities amid changes in capitalism, I have tremendously undervalued the advances in bourgeois rights and opportunities in industrial Britain. Marx discusses the phases of capitalism and their relationship with the division of labor in Marx (1970), 1, chapter 14, especially 336,348-50.
192.2 of the Westminster. Nesbitt (1934).
192.2 Party of Humanity. Everett (1939).
192.2 their meeting together Hutton (1885); Brown (1947); above, chapter 5. For studies of the social, intellectual, institutional, and patronage network of the scientific establishment of the period see Jensen (1970); MacLeod (1970).
193.1 and social philosophies. Haight (1968); Paris (1965); Kitchel (1933); Waddell (1976), who has guided my interpretation of George Eliot's role in this context.
193.1 "never can happen . . ." Eliot (1866), II, chapter 30, 88.
193.1 "nature of things." Eliot (1866), II, 89; cf. Peel (1971), 72-3.
193.1 "that delicate dependence." Eliot (1963), 420.
193.1 "Functions or duties." Eliot (1963), 421.
193.1 "for us beforehand. . . ." Eliot (1963), 422.
194.1 "are bound up." Eliot (1963), 422.
194.1 "the world's events." Eliot (1963), 428.
194.1 "and obey it." Eliot (1963), 429. For further discussion of the ideological issues reflected in Felix Holt, see Williams (1961), 112-19.
195.1 regret its tone. Herschel (1846), xlii-xliii; [Huxley] (1854); Huxley (1887), 187-9.
195.1 mind, and society. [Chambers] (1846); Chambers (1884)
195.2 "evil here below." [Chambers] (1844), 380-1.
195.2 "is in reserve." [Chambers] (1844), 384-5.
196.1 "of good cheer." [Chambers] (1844), 386.
196.2 self-improvement, and progress. Temkin (1947), especially 307-13; Millhauser (1959).
196.2 transformation, i.e., to Marxism. Weber (1930); cf. Young (1971), 191, 196.
197.1 "kindly to starvation." Engels (1969), 308-9.
197.2 genuinely radical historiography. As mentioned above, in developing a general thesis about reconciling rationalizations I have undervalued the relatively progressive social theories and activities of the nineteenth-century radicals and reformers, of whom Chambers was a notable example.
197.3 of his essays. Peel (1971); Spencer (1969, 1967). For modern analogies see Peel (1969); Young (1972, 1972a, 1977, 1981, 1982); Barker (1981), especially chapters 5-9.
198.1 and social theory. [Spencer] (1857); Spencer (1969a). Aspects of Spencer's work are discussed in practically all of my papers; with respect to the "physiological division of labour," see especially Young (1970), 159, 167-9, and Young (1971), 184-5, 202; Young (1972a).
199.1 in their work. See chapter 4.
.
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199.1 relatively internalist lines. Wilson (1970, 1971). M. J. S. Rudwick points out the significance of these journals in his review in the British Journal for the History of Science s (1971): 408-9.
199.1 the deeper continuities. Once again, this claim leaves the radicalism, of the Philosophical Radicals and other nineteenth-century reformers unevaluated.
200.2 sort of thing. it should be recalled that Marx had great admiration for Darwin's theory. He wrote to Lasalle in January 1861, "Darwin's book is very important and serves me as a natural-scientific basis for the class struggle in history. One has to put up with the crude English method of development, of course." Marx and Engels (1965), 123. It is important to bear in mind that Marx saw the conflation of Darwinism with Malthusianism - and their generalization into a single law of the "struggle for life" - as nothing more than "a very impressive method - for swaggering, sham-scientific, bombastic ignorance and intellectual laziness." Marx and Engels (1965), 240. See also above, pp. 20-1 and notes to p, 189.1. Nevertheless, Marx and Engels often made analogies between their work and Darwin's. For example, Engels did so at Marx's funeral and in his preface to the English edition of The Communist Manifesto. See also Young (1982), where I reflect on Marx and Engels' discussions of Darwin and their modern resonances.
200.3 the false consciousness For discussions of the concept of"false consciousness, see Harris (1971), 228ff.; Mannheim (1954), 62-7, 84-7. Engels wrote in 1893, "Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with false consciousness. The real motive forces irnpelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces." Marx and Engels (1965), 459. Problems involved in relating the concept of ideology and that of false consciousness to science are discussed in Young (1973, 1977c); Radical Science Journal Collective (1981).
200.3 present social order. Some historians of science who have read this passage have found it startlingly inconsistent with the aims and style of historical scholarship as they understand it. Some of the documents which can aid in building a bridge between their consciousness and Marxist interpretations of science, scientific rationality, and oppression are the following: Marcuse (1968a); Habermas (1971); Schroyer (1970). Whether or not they will decide to cross that bridge is, of course, another matter.
201.2 obviously do so. Conservative and neo-conservative ideologues, i. e., Paul Johnson and Tom Stoppard, have had good fun in mocking this passage. Having given some thought to their trajectories since it was written, I am glad to let it stand.
201.2 data before him. These issues are given further consideration in Young (1971, 1982a, 1985).
201.2 the former approach, Bukharin et al. (1971), 147-212.
201.2 the psychoanalytic view. Manuel (1968).
202.3 "facsism in 1933." Needham (1943), 12.
203.1 "for Isaac Newton . . ." Needham (1943), 144-5. Needham's admiration for Hessen has not diminished in the intervening years. In his "New Foreword" to the 1971 reprint of Science at the Cross Roads (1971), he wrote," Perhaps the outstanding Russian contribution was that of Boris Hessen, who made a long and classical statement of the Marxist historiography of science, taking as his subject of analysis Isaac Newton." It was "a veritable manifesto of the Marxist form of externalism in the history of science . . . This essay, with all its unsophisticated bluntness, had a great influence during the subsequent 40 years, an influence still perhaps not yet exhausted; hence its present reprinting is to be welcomed . . . The trumpet-blast of Hessen may therefore still have great value in orienting the minds of younger scholars towards a direction fruitful for historical analyses still to come, and may lead in the end to a deeper understanding of the mainsprings and hindrances of science in East and West, far more subtle and sophisticated than he himself could ever hope to be" (viii-ix).
203.2 new Marxist historiography. Bernal (1967), 406n. Cf. Young (1977a, 1980,
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Notes to Pages 203-213
1980a, 1982a, 1985). In each of these pieces I have considered aspects of Bernalism and alternative Marxist views of the historiography of science.
203.2 "for this book." Crowther (1967), vii.
203.2 "on social factors." Crowther (1967), 431.
204.1 the technological society." Crowther (1967), 432. Crowther reports a revealing aspect of the atmosphere at the Congress which also raises current issues about the relationship between scholarship, political commitment, and action: "None of the amateur or professional students of the history of science could think of any comment for opening a discussion of the Russians' enthusiastic and exciting papers. After a pause, a twenty-year-old youth named David Guest drew attention to the significance of their views, stressing especially the historical element in all their philosophical and scientific concepts, and contrasting this with the non-historical concepts employed by Pearson and Russell in their philosophy of science. No other speaker could think of anything more to say. Guest subsequently graduated with first class honours in philosophy in Cambridge University, and was killed in Spain in 1938, fighting with the International Brigade in defence of the Republican Government" (431-2.). Cf Bernal's remarks quoted in Bukharin et al. (1971), xxi.
204.1 it in detail. For expositions and discussions of the base-superstructure model, see Plekhanov (1969), 8 and chapters 8, 9, 11, 12 and 180 n. 11; Korsch (1970); Hall (1977); (Young 1979b, 1982a); Bottomore et al. (1983), 42-5.
204.1 "Roads in England." Bukharin et al. (1971), xi-xxix. See also his gracefully written wider study of the red scientists of the period which focuses on the ways in which British intellectuals took up this way of thinking, which came to be called "Bernalism." Werskey (1978).
204.1 of its limitations. Werskey (1971). He offers further reflections on this in his contribution to Rosenhead et al. (1982); cf. the contributions of Margot Heinemann and Young.
204.2 crude economic reductionism. Ollman points out what an easy target the distinction is in Ollman (1971), 6-9.
205.1 "of these struggles." Bukharin et al. (1971), 177.
205.1 "to the forefront." Bukharin et al. (1971), 166-7.
205.2 "from the skies," Merton (1968), 587.
205.2 "perished without comment." Hall (1963a), 9.
206.1 "'levels' which interact." Hobsbawm (1969a), 202; cf 200-1. See also Hobsbawm (1971).
207.1 "a going concern." Hobsbawm (1969), 203.
207.1 "immediately post-Marxian generations." Hobsbawm (1969), 309.
208.1 "instance, among philosophers." Taylor (1966), 229.
209.2 from their vulgarizers. Williams (1961), chapter 6, especially 271-4.
209.2 "the first degree." Williams (1961), 260. I have extended the quotation and have taken it from Marx and Engels (1965), 417.
210.1 "this quarter, too . Marx and Engels (1965), 418-19; cf Ollman (1971), 9-11.
210.1 "the need serves." Williams (1961), 266.
210.2 "kinds of societies." Williams (1972), 1419.
212.1 "rise to it . . ." Marx and Engels (1965), 459-60.
212.2 affair in biology. See Medvedev (1969);Joravsky (1970). Joravsky's liberal, functionalist account requires analysis from a radical perspective. See Young (1978); cf. Young (1971), 186-7, 204, 205.
213.1 of their work. It is a hopeless task to attempt to cite a literature covering this network of events and issues. Much has not been written down, while much that does get written down is ephemeral. For a perspective on "The Movement" from the point of view of rock music, see Young (1970a). A short list of books and collections of documents touching on a number of aspects of the development of the New Left is given below. In the same way that it is difficult for scholars who have been trained in the current orthodoxy seriously to entertain Marxism,
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it is hard for them to grasp the perspective of the New Left and subsequent developments or even to see the direct relevance of politics to their own practices as scholars. The challenge to state a precise definition of this political movement is, in the end, a mystification, since its essential nature is exploratory and experimental. Two most constant features are its libertarianism and its antiauthoritarianism. It is neo-Marxist rather than Marxist in the orthodox sense and involves a deep distrust of old leftist parties, their ideologies, and the development of the social and political order of the Soviet Union. Similarly, it is very ambiguous about its relations with the claim that the industrial working class is the sole revolutionary agent. Beyond these characteristics, there are endless factions and sects with particular orientations toward, e.g., women's liberation, black liberation, third world movements, ecology, gay liberation, and cultural politics. Beyond this, one must find one's own struggles and theoretical orientations. I won't reproduce the useful but dated references to these developments which appeared in the first published version of this essay. It would be too ironic to read in Thatcher's Britain. There are too many things which die and disappear which make one wonder what happened to all that hope. Here are some references which remain useful and evocative: Cockburn and Blackburn (1969); Oglesby (1969), especially Rudi Dutschke, "On Anti-Authoritarianism" and Martin Nicolaus, "The Unknown Marx"; Long (1969); Gray (1974); Teodori (1969); Blackburn (1972). For an anarcho-pacifist historical perspective on this period see N. Young (1977).
For examples of excellent critical scholarship, reinterpreting traditional issues from a New Left perspective, see Chomsky (1969); Horowitz (1969); Fischer (1971); Figlio (1979); Figlio (1982), and the appended bibliography. For an enduring essay on the vision of this period, see Roszak (1970). For some of the ongoing political, ideological, and cultural issues, see Gombin (1975); Young (1977c); London Labour Process/Left Strategy Group (1977), with its bibliography on the lessons of the 1960s and early 1970s.
213.1 the United States.) Mills (1961), the year before he died. For a bibliography of his writings and reviews of his works, see Horowitz (1963), 614-41. See also Horowitz (1964). For a critical perspective see Perlman (1970); Zeitlin (1971).
213.1 and Antonio Gramsci. This was - for a time - a prosperous translation industry, and I feel less inclined to prune the references to it. A selection: Nettl (1969a); Lukács (1971); Mészáros (1971a), Gramsci (1957, 1971); Howard and Klare (1972).
213.1 Habermas and Schmidt Therborn (1970); Adorno et al. (1969); Adorno (1967, 1967-8). The best overview of the Frankfurt School is Jay (1976), but see the excellent critique of Jay by Kellner (1975), who writes, "The key to understanding the object of critical theory is this interaction between the individual and the social world which can only be grasped dialectically. In this conception, no phenomenon, nothing, escapes determination by social processes. Individuals, scientific theory, works of art, the state are all to be understood as part of a social process, moments of a social totality. Hence critical theory is necessarily a critical theory of society" (139-40).
The writings of Marcuse are fundamental to rethinking science in a Marxist perspective. See Marcuse (1968, 1968a, 1969, 1969a, 1970); cf Cohen (1969) and articles on Marcuse by Jay, Aronson, and Breines in Fisher (1971), chapters 13-15; Habermas (1971); Schmidt (1971). There are worthwhile articles, reviews, and discussions by and about Lukács, the Frankfurt School, and related Marxist topics in nearly every issue of Telos. There is a related approach to these issues which has developed in the light of the environmentalists' thinking, see, e.g., Leiss (1972); Dickson (1974); Merchant (1982); Gorz (1980).
213.1 Benjamin and Lucien Goldmann. Benjamin (1969, 1967); Goldmann (1969)
213.1 are more accessible. Sartre (1963, 1968); Garaudy (1967, 1970, 1971).
213.1 Althusser, and Balibar The work of Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, and Foucault is most relevant here, of whom the last two have had a large following of theore-
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ticist Marxists and ex-Marxists. Their ideas swept through British intellectual Marxism for a time like a breath of carbon monoxide, but the air has recently been cleared, including mea culpas by some of those associated with the New Left Review who did so much to set this agenda for British Marxism. For an example of vintage Althusserianism, see Hirst (1971). For critiques which I find persuasive, see Clark (1977); Clark et al. (1980).
214.1 history of science. See below, pp. 243-5. I have touched on these issues in Young (1971, 1972, 1973). This essay is a further attempt to move toward a better grasp of them. The approach was carried further into cultural theory in Young (1979); Gardner and Young (1981); and into cultural practice in the "Crucible: Science in Society" series of television documentaries and books during 1981-3.
214.1 "made and valued." Williams (1971), 9.
214.1 "and challenging position." Williams (1971), 10.
215.1 "human political means." Williams (1971), 10-11.
216.1 "humanity from without." Jones (1971), 28; cf. Berger and Pullberg (1966). The classical neo-Marxist discussion is Lukacs, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," in Lukács (1971), 83-222.
216.1 not political, phenomena. Young (1972a, 1981).
216.2 deference and resignation. Marcuse argues that in the course of the development of modern science, "the 'nature of things,' including that of society, was so defined as to justify repression and even supression as perfectly rational." "Glorification of the natural is part of the ideology which protects an unnatural society in its struggle against liberation"; Marcuse (1968a), 122, 187. Schroyer develops this thesis: "Contemporary science and technology have become a new form of legitimating power and privilege . . . We argue that the scientistic image of science has become the dominant legitimating system of advanced industrial society . . . It is our thesis that the scientistic image of science is the fundamental false consciousness of our epoch." Schroyer (1970), 210, 212, 213; cf. Schroyer (1973).
216.2 colossal confidence trick. "Whereas Marx was able to formulate his critical theory as a critique of the purest ideological expression of equivalence exchange, i.e. classical political economy, we are forced to broaden our critique to the positivistic theory of science itself"; Schroyer (1970), 213. For a useful Marxist history, see Kolakowski (1972), especially chapters 2-4 re nineteenth century and chapter 8 re the political role of the current positivism.
217.1 the Soviet Union. From the point of view of current critiques of the dangers of, and domination by, science and technology, Bernal's The Social Function of Science (1967) is a very optimistic document. His main themes were to argue against any limitation on the development of science. He saw science in danger and not as danger. He identified the progress of science with the progress of society, with science increasingly serving as a model and guide for social improvements. Bernal's vision of science as an unequivocally progressive force has come increasingly to be seen in terms of Frankenstein's monster. See especially chapters 14-16 and critiques by Werskey (1975, 1978); Young (1980, 1980a).
217.1 perpetuation of Stalinism. On the notion of Marxism as objectivity, see Young (1971), 197; Young (1977c, 1982, 1985).
217.1 "conception of society." Goldmann (1971), 67-8.
218.2 critique of culture. See, for example, Brinton (1970); Carr (1969); Garaudy (1970), all the more interesting because of his own trajectory from ultra-orthodoxy to a more critical perspective. For an extremely evocative recreation of the consequences of vulgar Marxism and Stalinism in the arts, see Mandelstam (1971), especially chapter 55, which begins, "'it turns out we are part of the superstructure,' M. said to me in 1922 . . ." (258).
218.1 'with its superstructure.' Harris (1971), 154. Harris is here referring to Stalin's famous essay Concerning Marxism in Linguistics (1950), in which Stalin was liberalizing the relationship between ideological control and scientific practice. See Joravsky (1970), 150ff.; Graham (1971).
219.2 and the Crundrisse. The main new sources for this approach are Marx (1961, 1973); Marx and Engels (1964).
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219.3 Rupert Hall's position See above pp. 174-5, 205, and below, pp. 230-1.
220.1 In his papers Lakatos (1970, 1971).
221.2 "Historiography of Science." Buchdahl (1965).
221.2 as paradigm shifts. Kuhn (1970).
222.1 rationality in science. Scheffler (1967), especially 15-19 and chapter 4.
222.2 reassuring, even affable. Kuhn (1970). Kuhn is particularly keen to dissociate himself from Paul Feyerabend's conceptual anarchism (234-5) and to rebut charges of "irrationality," "mob rule," and "relativism" (259-66).
222.2 of the dilemma, Kuhn (1968).
223.1 "the lay public." Kuhn (1971), 281-2.
223.1 Darwin and Wallace. Kuhn (1971), 301-2. Kuhn is here commenting on the argument of chapter 2 of this book.
224.1 Smith and de Beer. See above, pp. 179-82.
224.1 of Darwin's discovery. Gruber (1974).
224.2 "that field engage." Kuhn (1971), 280.
224.3 "so through technology." Kuhn (1971), 283.
224.3 "radically distinct enterprises." Kuhn (1971), 285.
225.3 in the world. See Barnes (1972); cf. his more recent works, cited in Barnes and Edge (1982).
226.1 a debating chamber.) See Young (1971b); Anon. (1972); Chaulieu (1972).
226.2 ultimately draws back. For a useful compendium with a bibliography of writings by and about Kuhn see Gutting (1980). My later thoughts on Kuhn appear in Young (1982a).
226.3 a paperbound edition. Merton (1970), which contains a new preface and bibliography; cf the review by Rattansi (1971) and the debate on the Merton hypothesis which was conducted for several years in Past and Present, beginning with Kearney (1964) and continuing at least until Shapiro (1968). Most of the relevant references are listed in Merton's 1970 bibliography. Cf. Mason (1953).
226.3 1949 and 1968. Merton (1968), chapters 14, 15, 17-21.
226.3 role of ideas. Merton (1968), 585.
226.3 "the bourgeois Lukács." Lichtheim (1967), title essay, 3-46, at 35.
226.3 the Great Depression. Heyl (1980); Young (1981); Gouldner (1971); London Labour Process/Left Strategy Group (1977); Russett (1966); Henderson (1970).
227.2 approach to science. Merton (1968), 586.
227.2 "of scientist's behaviour." Merton (1968), 661-4. In his 1938 essay (published a year earlier) Merton was less critical of vulgar Marxism. He wrote, "In the discussion of the technical and scientific problems raised by certain economic developments, I follow closely the technical analysis of Prof. B. Hessen in his provocative essay, 'The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's "Principia"' . . . Prof. Hessen's procedure, if carefully checked, provides a very useful basis for determining empirically the relations between economic and scientific developments. Their relations are probably different in an other than capitalist economy since the rationalisation which permeates capitalism stimulates the development of scientific technology." He elsewhere says, "The following discussion is heavily indebted to Hessen...." Merton (1970), 142n., 185n.; cf. 206-7 and Merton (1968), 661, 664.
227.3 "fields of investigation." Merton (1970), 54.
228.1 "the same subject." Merton (1968), 629-30.
228.1 "glorification of god." Merton (1968), 634-5; cf. 628-9.
228.1 "and subsequent centuries." Merton (1968), 635.
228.1 toward individual problems. Merton (1968), chapters 17, 18, 20, 21.
228.3 "of Max Weber" Marcuse (1968); cf Birnbaum (1953); Gouldner (1971), 179-80.
229.1 "Progressiveness of Science." King (1980, cf 1968). There is a useful criticism of Merton's adaptation to American functionalist norms in Crowther (1957), chapter 47. See also Barnes and Dolby (1970).
229.2 the social sciences. See Merton (1968), Part 1: "On Theoretical Sociology," reprinted as Merton (1967); Demerath and Peterson (1967).
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229.2 given and value neutral. For a more systematic development of these ideas, see Young (1981).
229.3 of Barbara Heyl. Heyl (1980).
230.1 "end of ideology" I have discussed this issue in Young (1971), 182, 198-201. See also below, notes to p. 233.2.
230.1 "a mediation of?" Hall (1963a), 6.
230.2 of false consciousness. Lichtheim (1967), 15, 18-22, 41, 43-6.
231.l "or should happen." Hall (1963a), 14-15.
231.1 of interest groups. The potential fruitfulness of reconciliation and further development of the liberal and functionalist perspectives of Hall and Merton are canvassed by Arnold W Thackray in an admirably clear review of many of the issues considered in the present essay: Thackray (1970a). He argues for a "'via media' which avoids the extreme formulations" of either pure history of ideas or vulgar Marxism (124). His position is ecclectic (126). He has begun to apply his approach in Thackray (1974). The conference at which this paper was read showed clearly that Mertonianism is alive and well in Philadelphia. This took a quantitative turn in Thackray (1978), which I discuss in Young (1982a). He also became editor of Isis, the main professional journal in history of science and is a respected custodian of consensus views in the profession. He went on to coauthor Morrell and Thackray (1981), which I have not read.
231.2 "Influences on Research." Crowther (1957), chapters 45-6.
232.1 "of undisturbed study." Crowther (1957), 288.
232.1 "explorations of scholasticism." Crowther (1957), 289-90. Hall's behavior as a member of granting bodies certainly bears out Crowther's views.
232.1 "new scientific powers." Crowther (1957), 290-1; cf. xiv-xvii.
233.2 in unmasking it. Rousseas and Farganis (1963); Lasch (1968); Hodges (1967); MacIntyre (1971); the debate nicely sums up the problem of being "above the battle." It has been conveniently packaged in anthologies: Waxman (1968); Rejai (1971). For a more general, albeit liberal, discussion of the role of intellectuals, see Reiff (1969), especially Nettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent" (1969).
233.2 the scientific laboratory. In Britain there is a growing movement centering around the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (publishers of Science for People), an umbrella organization for a number of coalitions of radical experts. The American radical movement which was called Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA) publishes Science for the People and called its organization by the same name. These activities at the level of agitation must be complemented by recognition of the unity of science and its metaphysics with politics. Once again, see Marcuse (1968a), chapter 9, especially 181-6.
234.1 a historical development. Thompson (1968); cf. his masterly integration of data from varying levels of analysis: Thompson (1971).
234.1 their sweeping generalizations. Thompson (1965). The articles of Anderson and Nairn are cited in Thompson's footnotes. This phase of the debate ended with a withering critique of the respective positions, and terms of reference, of Thompson and Anderson's exchange: Poulantzas (1967), who was later driven to despair by subsequent political developments. Anderson concedes some weaknesses in his reply (1966), 17-18.
234.2 "horticulture and stock-breeding." Thompson (1965), 335.
234.2 a pure ideologue. Thompson (1965), 335.
235.1 "must give way." Thompson (1965), 335.
235.2 in the Enlightenment. Anderson (1966), "The Role of Religion and Science," 17-23, especially 20.
235.2 widely known of all. These points are nearly all commonplaces in the literature of the Darwinian debate, except for the claim that the debate was conducted almost wholly within a theistic context. See the earlier chapters in this book and Ellegard (1958). The Wilberforce-Huxley confrontation is discussed as part ofa clichéd account above, in chapter 1 and Lucas (1979). There are numerous other
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points of detail and substance on which both Thompson and Anderson show surprising and disheartening ignorance of the role and scope of the nineteenth-century debate and the issues of science and scientific naturalism.
236.1 "is no exception." Anderson (1966), 19.
236.1 "course of things." Anderson (1966), 20.
236.1 as a rationalization. There is a very large literature on "Social Darwinsm," while the use of biological theory as a rationalization of social and political theories is very nearly ubiquitous. The following sources review much of the literature: Hofstadter (1955); Wiener (1949); Semmel (1968); Russett (1966); Demerath and Peterson (1967); Peel (1969); Rogers (1972); Bannister (1979); Young (1981, in press);Jones (1980, 1978).
236.1 "over sober accuracy." Anderson (1966), 40, 41.
236.2 "the National Culture," Anderson (1968). Reverting for a moment to the auto-biographical mode of Section II of this essay, I find it ironic that Jeremy Mulford gave me a copy of Anderson's article in 1968, stressing its significance for my work. I did not see the point of reading it until December 1970, in the midst of the British Home Secretary's (ultimately successful) campaign to deport the German revolutionary invalid, Rudi Dutschke.
237. 1 "with their concepts." Young (1971), 192-3.
237.1 made here remains. I gather that in 1983 he found his way to a repudiation of Althusserianism and its baleful effects on British intellectual life. Intervening episodes in the Anderson/Thompson saga do not take us any further on this issue. See Thompson (1978), 255-6. Anderson is finally reduced to referring to Darwin as a basis for scientistic analogies. He is meant to provide the missing mechanism for change for Marxism, i.e., the genetics of social change. See Anderson (1980), 60-1, 80. For comments on Thompson's historiography of science, see Radical Science Journal Collective (1981), 25-9. Wasn't it the prereligious Dylan who said that we should not follow leaders and should watch our parking meters?
237.2 "corresponding social relations." Marx and Engels (1970), 117.
237.3 with scientific respectability. Meek (1954a).
238.1 distribution, and acceptance. Frankel (1969), 27,
239.1 "universally valid ones." Marx and Engels (1964), 61.
240.1 "order and progress." This slogan found its way from Comtism and its British disciples and part-allies (e.g., J. S. Mill, G. H. Lewes, and Herbert Spencer) and went as far afield as the rationalizations of the Mexican científicos, the motto on the flag of Brazil, and the ideology of Oriental Westernizers. See, for example, Simon (1963); Womack (1969), 10, 208, etc.; Dunn (1972), 49; Schwartz (1969), passim; Kwok (1965).
240.1 version of associationism . Young (1968).
240.1 world of computers. This is, of course, the argument of Marcuse, Habermas, and Schroyer. However, the analysis can be developed in much greater detail and scope, with explicit links between evolutionism and particular industrial rationalizations and techniques. A short list of relevant sources: Aron (1967); Haber (1964); Baritz (1960); Young (1972a, 1981).
Biologistic and scientistic rationalizations of the hierarchical division of labor are not a capitalistic monopoly. See, for example, Lenin (1969), 417; cf. 450. Lenin was not so enthusiastic about Taylor in 1914. See Lenin (1970). Cf. Smith (1983), 11-22.
241.1 "men to nature." Schmidt (1972), 49. "But if nature and society are internally related (Marx explicitly denies nature and history are 'two separate things'), an examination of any aspect of either involves one immediately with aspects of the other"; Ollman (1971), 53.
241.1 "are socially determined." Schmidt (1972), 32-3.
242.1 "hardly modified historically . . ." Marx and Engels (1964), 42.
242.1 "the surrounding world." Goldmann (1969), 26.
242.2 led to fatalism. "Lukács' critique of science was aimed at the contemplative position which he claimed it implied. To regard society as governed by scientific
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laws, was, according to Lukács, to take a reflective attitude to it, instead of intervening actively to change it and thereby transcend its laws." Therborn (1970), 75; cf. 82-3.
242.2 "a social category." Lukács (1971), 130.
242.2 "laws of nature." Lukács (1971), 131.
242.2 of bourgeois thought. Lukács (1971), 174. There are numerous passages in Lukács' analysis which are extremely apposite to the basic line of argument of the present essay, e.g., 11, 14, 19, 23, 38, 49, 54, 70, 101, 135, 157, 178, 181, 231, 237, 240-1, 245, 314, 334. Lukács argued that the ideology of science blinds people's vision to the realities of their own existence in the social world. "It does this by inculcating the illusion, or what Marx called the 'false consciousness,' that existing social arrangements are governed by immutable laws, very much like those which prevail in the processes of the physical world and, like them, beyond the power of man to change. To anyone so indoctrinated - and this, ceteris paribus may comprise all classes of the population - all social processes take on a illusory or 'reified' appearance in the sense that they come to be regarded as having an 'objective,' external reality of their own, as though they were something other than the activities of members of the same society in their relations with one another. This, according to Lukács, is the clue to man's split personality as a member of modern societies; what he thinks he does in that capacity (his consciousness) bears no relation to what he actually does (his existence). If anything, the accomplishments of science tend to nourish the very social irrationality already fostered by the reified structure of its parent ideology. By isolating the facts of the empirical world for specialised study, for example, the social sciences have to disregard the organic unity which alone gives them meaning and, by treating them as hard and fast data, they convert what are essentially potentialities into finalities." Labedz (1962), 158-9; cf. 164.
242.3 extrapolations are based. "It was a great and important historical advance when the Enlighteners of the 18th century started to investigate the natural conditions surrounding social development and attempted to apply the categories and results of the natural sciences directly to the knowledge of society. Naturally, this gave rise to much that was perverse and unhistorical, but in the struggle with the traditional theological conception of history it signified a very considerable advance at the time. It was quite different in the second half of the 19th century. If historians or sociologists now attempted to make Darwinism, for example, the immediate basis of an understanding of historical development, this could only lead to a perversion and distortion of historical connections. Darwinism becomes an abstract phrase and the old reactionary Malthus normally appears as its sociological 'core.' In the course of later development the rhetorical application of Darwinism to history becomes a straightforward apology for the brutal domination of capital. Capitalist competition is swollen into metaphysical history-dissolving mystique by the 'eternal law' of the struggle for existence." Lukics (1969), 207.
243.1 "all socially conditioned." Lukács (1971), 234. This passage has not been allowed to pass without comment. Given the tremendous weight of traditional dualism and empiricism, it is very difficult indeed to see Lukács' analysis in fully relational, dialectical terms. It is thus easy to conclude that he has here crossed over into idealism. Schmidt objects specifically to the passage: "Lukács pointed correctly to the social-historical conditioning of all natural consciousness as also of phenomenal nature itself But in Marx nature is not merely a social category. [Lukács did not say that it was - RMY]. It cannot be totally [again - RMY] dissolved into the historical process of its appropriation in respect of form, content, extent and objectivity. If nature is a social category, the inverted statement that society is a category of nature is equally valid [yes]. Although nature and its laws subsist independently of all human consciousness and will for the materialist Marx, it is only possible to formulate and apply statements about nature with the help of social categories." Schmidt (1972), 70. He elsewhere says of
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Lukács that "he dissolves nature, both in form and content, into the social forms of its appropriation" (96; Cf. 288 n. 148).
If Schmidt, a younger member of the Frankfurt School, can express this view, it is not surprising that it is put far more strongly in Stedman Jones' Althusserian essay "The Marxism of the Early Lukács, an Evaluation" (1971). Sections 3 and 4 are entitled "The Assault on Science" and "Science and Class Struggle" (44-64). He refers to Lukács' "romantic, antiscientific thematic," raises the crucial issue, and gives an answer which sets clear limits to ideological analysis of the methods and substance of science: "Historical materialism can theorise the significance of scientific activity as is [sic] social practice and can formulate the specific social and historical conditions in which new sciences have emerged: but it does not thereby arbitrate their validity or their scientificity. To believe otherwise is to conflate the social bearers of science with its substantive contents; the materialist history of a science with its epistemology" (61-2). It is precisely this conflation - yielding a double perspective - which I am advocating and which I believe Lukács saw. I once tried to discuss this issue with Jones but was unable to persuade him to relinquish the role of patient explainer. For further criticisms of Lukács as idealist, see Poulantzas (1967), 61-3.
243.1 separated from nature?" Gramsci (1957), 109.
243.1 One Dimensional Man. Marcuse (1968a), chapters 6 and 9, especially 180-6; cf 115-19. See also Young (1979c) where I try to put these perspectives together in a brief argument.
244.1 Lefebvre are helpful. In addition to the writings of Lukács, Goldmann, Lefebvre, Schmidt, and Ollman cited above, see Mészáros (1970, 1971); Avineri (1968). For a review of Avineri's book which shows starkly what is at issue between neo-Marxism and Bolshevism see Fernbach (1969); Lefebvre (1968); Young (1977c, 1982a).
244.2 "ordering the world." Horton (1967).
244.2 challenge is promising. B. Wilson (1970).
244.2 of scientific cosmologies. Douglas (1970, 1975, 1975a). Some of Prof Douglas' more recent inquiries into conventions and boundaries are discussed in Young (1982a).
245.2 historians of science. Sohn Rethel (1975, 1976, 1978).
245.2 "himself needs educating." Marx and Engels (1965), 28 ("Theses on Feuerbach, III").
246.1 nature, and society. For discussions of the concept of totality, see Sartre (1963), 25ff and chapter 2; Goldmann (1969), 127, etc.; Lefebvre (1968a).