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Robert M. Young Online Writings
WHAT SCIENTISTS HAVE TO LEARN
by Robert M. Young
I cannot remember when I was not interested in science. I recalled that
the first (I later realised it was the second) club I belonged to was set up to pursue
science electricity. The Christmas present I valued most in primary school was a
chemistry set. I studied natural sciences throughout school and university, stayed for an
extra year exclusively devoted to them and then entered an extremely academic medical
school where we took the same courses in medical sciences as people pursuing doctorates. I
enjoyed all of those studies. I admire science and scientists, am very respectful of what
science and other forms of expertise have done and are likely to do for humanity. My own
life has been dramatically saved at least twice by alert doctors, as have those of a
number of lovedones, one of whom is becoming a doctor. I am a passionate consumer of
certain technologies, an ardent watcher of programmes about science and a devoted student
of scientific and technological achievements.
And yet I come here today having to discipline myself to be civil.
Whenever I hear or read certain phrases such as the public understanding of
science and the image of science I want to be rude and scatological. I
think of the people who work under their banners in the most unflattering terms
toadying and sycophantic, dupes and opportunists even when they are friends and
former students of mine. I am not alone in the academic community in holding this view: I
note the absence of the entire staff of the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine
(housed in this building) from our proceedings here today. I dare say that they have
stayed away voluntarily because of their views on the public understanding of
science movement or that communicatrion between academic scholars and this group is
so bad that they dont even know of this meeting. [I later learned that the latter
explanation was the right one.] I experience the work done in this area as inimical to
human survival, well-being and civility. I think of the scientists who foster this work as
smug, uncritical, boorish (sometimes twice over boor and Boer) and contemptuous of
people in other serious disciplines who are deserving of their respect and from whom they
have much to learn, rather than being patronising toward them. I also wonder why the media
go on putting before us spokespeople who are miles from the most interesting current
debates about science and society. The disciplines where those debates are taking place
are the history, philosophy and social studies of science and critiques of science and
scientific rationality, as well as related approaches to technology, medicine and other
forms of expertise.
I have been practising as a psychotherapist long enough to recognise
much of what I have just said as consisting of perhaps more than a grain of truth but also
as embedded in a regrettable reprojection That is, when one is denigrated and has
demeaning and scatological epithets fired into ones mind and at ones
lifes work, it is almost impossible to refrain from saying, as if in the schoolyard,
Youre another and, alas, often adding amplification in the form of
And sos your mum, or words to that effect (Young, 1992).
Something similar happens on public occasions when these matters are
debated. I speak with some authority here, since I am a fairly frequent participant in
such debates: today is one of them, and I see here people with whom I have discussed these
and related matters several times in recent months, notably under various BBC 2 Late
Show television auspices. In my experience, these programmes are invariably set up
in an unhelpful way, one which was epitomised some months ago when I tried to make a point
which I thought had some subtlety, whereupon the moderator, Mark Lawson, turned to Bob
Williamson and translated what I had said into a sentence that asked him if he thought of
himself as Baron von Frankenstein. The details dont matter. What is important is
that these occasions are structured adversarially dochotomously and there
are powerful structural causes which lead the participants to play out the implicit
scripts which the situation prestructures. Not only are the line-ups cast in those terms;
the conventions of television and the time-frame of the programmes call for pithy sound
bytes. I have learned this the hard way from being interviewed alone and asked what I
think about this or that, only to be told afterwards that only suitable bytes were to be
used, woven in the editing process into an adversarially-structured whole. I take it that
this is thought to meet certain norms of being entertaining. I think it fosters a dialogue
of the deaf.
As you have already seen and as some of my old friends and students
will tell you, I am not a stranger to blunt and aggressive ways of putting things, but I
am also capable of more reflective and exploratory ones. But if you put me third or fourth
in line in a discussion kicked off by a truly Canute-like scientist who slags off whole
disciplines (I have Lewis Wolpert in mind) or by one (viz. Richard Dawkins on a
recent Late Show) who offers the hypothesis that the spread of fads, religion
and cultural phenomena can be illuminated by epidemiological models used in the study of
viral diseases and even calls culture a collection of viruses and closes by reflecting on
how long it may take to develop a vaccine (n.b., a vaccine against culture,
implying that it is a disease), Ill be straining at the leash by the time I get to
make my bytes.
Thats what I will be likely to do, but what I will be feeling is something altogether different. Ill be feeling forlorn and saying to myself
and to the producer in response to his or her thank-you letter, I wish we
hadnt started from there and that something more open-ended and facilitating
had been set up more like open ended format of After Dark or an
exploratory dialogue. Id love to take part in a programme where I am in a discussion
with one or two people, thinking gently together. What I mean by not starting from
here is that I would like, for a change, to begin with the point of view of the
critique of the self-consciousness of scientists rather than ending up there after wading
through a lot of tedious set-pieces and reassurances that one is not being utterly
irrationalist, relativist and opposed to progress and the alleviation of suffering. As
things are, by the time the programme is over I feel lucky to have got to square one of my
own agenda.
But thats only for starters. I made a series of documentaries
which were shown in the first year of Channel Four, and the process of making them is why
I went into psychoanalysis and became a publisher of books. That is, I found television so
competitive and full of snarling careerists, liars and opportunists that I was driven to
despair and became an analytic patient and then a therapist and in my intellectual work
decided to go for the narrowcasting of the printed word. Of course, similar things can be
said about academic life (including and especially under the auspices of the Wellcome
Trust, but thats another story) and of publishing and come to that of
the world of psychotherapy (Young, 1990). I have reluctantly concluded that these ways of
behaving are characteristic of human nature on the hoof (Young, 1994). But that does not
mean that we should give up. I think the printed word (surely one of the media we should
be here to talk about) is more hospitable to flexible ways of being ruminative and
communicating, and I do what I can to facilitate enlightenment in this domain, for
example, by founding, editing, subsidising and contributing to journals and other
publications. However, there are pressures here, as well, especially those of
profitability. I have spent the last decade working as an editor and publisher. I have
been responsible for the appearance of about two hundred volumes books and issues
of quarterly periodicals and have lost about a million pounds, an average of five
thousand pounds per volume. Some came from friends and family, some from well-wishers,
most out of my own hide, and I will almost certainly die before all the debts are paid
off. I have recently brought in a distinguished and enlightened publisher to be managing
director, and the process of rapprochement with the consensus is already well under way in
both the way we work and what it is thought sensible to publish and at what price. Profit
is a likely consequence.
Even so, I continue to think the conditions of production of the
printed word are more accommodating than television. I think radio is somewhere in between
and long for the kinds of slots that used to be commonplace on the BBC Radios Third
Programme. I hope and trust that some of the airtime coming on stream as new stations are
commissioned will be devoted to exploratory discussions about science and related issues.
(Anything, please, rather than more phone-in trivia.) I gather that in America
non-commercial and local television stations have managed to make a good deal of space for
such discussions. Looking ahead, I feel that relatively low-cost computer dissemination,
use of videos, interactive discs and other digital technologies will provide even more and
cheaper spaces. To tell the truth, I feel sure that we have more facilitative technologies
available to us at this moment than we make use of. I am thinking of common-or-garden
compact cassettes and videos. Why are there not networks creating, disseminating, copying
and swapping them? I suspect and I include myself in this indictment that we
dont believe in ourselves enough and wait to be tapped by the official media before
we believe we have much to say or the means of disseminating our ideas. We do not
sufficiently take these matters into our own hands. It may seem ironic for me to say this,
since I have played a significant part in creating a number of cultural spaces for such
debates. But I do say it of sound and visual technologies and would like to raise the
question of our timidity as one topic for todays discussion. I am also particularly
intrigued by the worlds opened up by computer modems and world-wide networks accessible
down every phone line. Floppy and interactive disc technologies seem to me to open up
lovely, relatively inexpensive narrowcasting possibilities for paper-less publishing.
These communications media are not yet central to my practice, but I hope and believe that
they will soon become so.
In considering these alternatives I am still reflecting on whats
wrong with the treatment of issues connected with science on television and in places like
the New Scientist, where it seems obvious to me they should be debated but for the
most part are not. I co-wrote a long critique of science on TV over a decade ago. It was
printed in an Open University reader (Gardner and Young, 1981), but I have never had a
dickey-bird in reply. I was too shattered to write about my experience making a dozen
hour-long documentaries in the series called Crucible: Science in Society
(except for a short piece in educational newsletter entitled Television: The Dense
Medium Young, 1986), and until today no one has asked me what I think. I find
this odd, since I think I am right in saying that our series was the best-resourced
alternative perspective in the history of the medium (at least up until then). I do not
say it was the best. I unreservedly pass that accolade to Pandoras Box
(which, to be precise, was about scientism - illegitimate extrapolations not
science per se). But the Crucible series was important and
well-received in certain circles, some of them quite distinguished, and not one has ever
been shown again, not even the excellent ones on ideas of nature, human nature, the
scientific hero and the scientific management of leisure. I often wonder why. On the other
hand, I do not wonder why the Crucible series was succeeded by
Equinox, which is highly professional and excellent in its way, but that way
goes with the grain of the dominant culture. Genuinely dissident voices are seldom
given their own platforms on television, and it is my impression that the growing scope
for independent productions leads largely to commissioning the work of slick
professionals, not awkward or subversive voices. That is, I think things are getting worse
and are likely to get even worse as a result of further conglomeration and
commmercialisation.
This leads naturally to another point about television. It is an
obvious but deep one. Television is a technology, one with a structure of funding,
careers, division of labour and pressures which militate against programmes which go against the grain of the culture. For the most part, editors and producers are employed to see
to that. It is not a transparent medium; it is part of the problem. Ways have been found
to tell about scandals in science as well as in other spheres. But television, in my
experience, is not good at examining frameworks, assumptions, terms of reference. In
short, it is excellent at gee whiz, good at criticism and bad at critique. While I was
making programmes full time, whenever I tried to talk about matters like funding, for
example, the role of the Rockefeller charities, my director (a sympathetic one and still a
friend) would say, Where are the pictures? I wanted to go into the archives,
show the plans for Rockefeller projects: the Yale Institute of Human Relations, the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, the Tavistock Institute, the creation of
sociobiology and molecular biology and the rest of the world-wide conspiracy (a conspiracy
which was acknowledged by the patrons and which has been well-documented by many
scholars), including the Trilateral Commission, which has fundamentally shaped the natural
and social sciences and the caring professions and has created the model for the funding
of research throughout the first world. Similar (though smaller-scale) stories could and
should be told about the Carnegie, Ford, Wellcome, Macy, Wenner-Gren, and MacArthur
Foundations and other patrons, but its not suitably visual. Why not? They can do
documentaries about financial conspiracies. Why not scientific ones and ones about
patronage? The science we get is the science which is funded. Lets look closely at
that process.
And there is something deeper than that, for which I fear I am unable
to find words. It is the point where the metaphysics of television as a technology
intersect the critique of the metaphysics of science and other forms of expertise (from
now on Ill just say science, but what I mean goes for town planning,
architecture, accountancy, and professionalism in general) to choke off the imagination.
The phrase all thats solid melts into air comes to mind. I will put
before you some thoughts from the notes I made in preparing this talk in the hope that
they will evoke something in some of you. What I am saying about television is true of
other media, but I think it is most disabling with respect to television.
Part of the received false self-consciousness of experts is the belief
that what they do is value-neutral but, of course, amenable to use and abuse. They
consider anyone who says otherwise is polluting science. I am routinely treated as a
polluter. Science is one thing, values another. Science should be distinguished from its
applications. Science is objective; culture is subjective. Values are extrinsic to
science, intrinsic to society. These shibboleths are part of the fabric of how you treat
things in the media. There is a concept of objectivity which is deeply embedded in the
documentary tradition which makes it very hard to argue for ways of thinking which
challenge the received authority of scientific rationalism. It is one of the proudest
boasts of the BBC that it reports the news objectively, and the whole world thanks them
for it. I admire it, but this tradition acts as a form of censorship when one is seeking
to go deeper and understand how facts get constructed.
On the other hand, for some reason which has already escaped me, it
seems okay for a scientist to come along and behave like a nineteenth-century positivist
(I mean a follower of Auguste Comte; see Simon, 1963; Kolakowski, 1972) and generate
values from facts, as Come did with his proposed religion of humanity. They can pronounce
with the authority of an expert on objectivity about all sorts of things and, for the most
part, get away with it. They are not only thought expert in rationality; they are thought
wise. I am thinking, for example, of some of the sillier pronouncements of Louis Wolpert
(who condemns sociology and the philosophy of science out of hand) and Richard Dawkins
(who deploys scientistic analogies with touching philosophical simplicity), as well as of
the ways scientists from Einstein to Bronowski to Zuckerman to Medawar have been treated
as gurus when they hold forth far beyond their areas of undoubted contribution. They offer
science as above the battle and as an arbiter of cultural issues in a startling and deeply
embarrassing way, and the media producers fawn over them in a way they never do to Edward
Said or Raymond Williams (1982, etc.) or Dennis Potter or Richard Rorty (1980, 1982,
1989). I dare say a couple of those names will not be familiar to most scientists, but
they all should, even by virtue of C. P. Snows observation that scientists are more
likely to know about the striking features of the arts than arts people are to know
anything about science (Snow, 1959).
I want some cultural spaces which allow it to be said and explored that
values are intrinsic to all forms of expertise. I think science is the embodiment of
values in theories, therapies, things, systems, software and institutions. If people
understood the history of the metaphysical foundations of science, they would begin to
understand this. I think that all facts are theory-laden, all theories are value-laden;
all values are part of ideologies or world-views. I think that unless the
practitioners of science are as well-versed in this dimension of what they do as they are
in, say, the calculus, DNA, fundamental particles, thermodynamics, information systems and
so on, the world is going to hell in a wheelbarrow. I think that the relationship between
science and democracy is completely unsorted-out and that we will destroy the planet and
perhaps much more unless we get that relationship right. The future the very
existence of life depends, urgently depends, on it.
I think we need to understand how societies constitute, evoke and
valorise research priorities and the criteria for acceptable answers (Young, 1979). This
is a deeply cultural enquiry, and a few people have begun to show how this process occurs
and how it might be done better. I am thinking pre-eminently on the work of Donna Jean
Haraway (1989, 1990, 1992) on the creation of the discipline of primate studies but also
her essays on the processes of scientific research in general, for which I believe she
deserves a Nobel Prize (Young, 1992a). I do not think one should be at the bench in
science without a deep understanding of moral, ethical, social, cultural, ideological,
economic and political issues. Science is too important to leave to people who have had
more than half of their minds split off from what they do for a living. I think we must
think anew about the concept of accountability.
I think that young people have more than a dim sense of these matters
and that more and more of them are voting with their feet into more avowedly
value-oriented careers or into cynicism. They dont like much of what they know about
what science and other forms of expertise have wrought. They do know that much of what is
here or around the corner has not been adequately thought through with respect to the
human parameters consequences, side effects. Think of all the times we have been
told that things are safe when they turned out not to be. I am thinking of Windscale,
Chernobyl, the silent spring, pollution, antibiotic resistance, tardive dyskinesia,
thalidomide, and much, much more, while what has been achieved is shamelessly hyped, for
example AZT, which, as a Wellcome product, subsidises us at todays conference. (Am I
alone in finding the opulence of this, the Wellcome Building, difficult to reconcile with
a notion of service to humanity by means of the alleviation of suffering?) But, as
importantly, I am thinking about the increasing access to parameters of the constitution
of what it means to be a person with this or that attribute and how research priorities
and applications get grotesquely distorted by economic forces which militate for a
saleable commodity or a competitive edge. I am not against gene therapy for cystic
fibrosis or Huntingdons chorea or Tay Sachs disease or perhaps hypertension or
diabetes. I hate being put in a false dichotomy about scientific progress when people have
got such a therapy waiting to be deployed, yet the society and culture have not thought
deeply enough about the context into which it is to be introduced.
I am saying that we need a coherent education system in which science
and values are part of a single framework of ideas. To understand how values ever got
sequestered, we have to teach the philosophy of nature at a very early age. I am thinking
of the profound writings of Edwin Arthur Burtt (1932) and Alfred North Whitehead (1925) on
the metaphysical debates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the consequences
for understanding nature, life and human nature. In particular, I am thinking about the
banishment of the final causes of the Aristotelian tradition. This was a con trick. They
never went away but have been sequestered. They are still at work sub rosa in all
the splitting into dichotomies which characterise the official version of these matters.
Values, use values, purposes, ideologies and politics are at work at every level of
science and other forms of expertise. I say again: the teleology of Aristotle never went
away. It just went into the back room and into the relatively inaccessible process of the
constitution of research conceiving problems and patronage, for example (Young,
1979a, 1989, 1993). We should consider philosophy, morality and cultural studies as three
of the four legs of a stool on which we seat our specialisms. No more tripos. We need a
more stable stool.
I also think most scientists are a bit weird and that many go
into maths, science and technology and even medicine because they do not feel able to deal
with feelings. I am sure of this with respect to every famous scientist I have ever known,
and I have been close to a goodly number. (One particularly nasty one who was routinely
scathing about philosophy of science and the arts got so contemptuous that hardly anyone
could stand him. I think he ended up unable to stand himself. He secretly went into
Jungian analysis and is now a lot nicer fellow.) These people are weird but end up with
our lives in their hands in a number of senses. It is not smart for a society to do this.
The media of film and drama understand how odd scientists and the scientific world view
are, and thats why they go on depicting scientists the way they do from
Paracelsus and Faustus to Baron von Frankenstein to The Island of Dr Moreau to all those
Basil Rathbones, Boris Karloffs, Peter Cushings and Vincent Prices and on to Jeff
Goldbloom (as Jim Watson, as The Fly and as the cynical hired scientist in
Jurassic Park) and so on. The wider culture is not misinformed. They know that
the moral senses of scientists are usually stunted because of their tendency to cut
themselves off, their lopsided education and their preoccupation with research and career.
For this reason, I want to include an understanding, both theoretical
and practical, of psychodynamics and group relations in the education of scientists
(Young, 1992, 1993a). I want us to look carefully at the way scientists live and work and
conduct their lives and what should be done about it. The requirements of the research,
the next post, the next grant are, I believe, even more pressing and blinkering than they
are in other niches of the division of labour. Everyone knows this about medical education
and training. It is not so well-researched and understood in physics, chemistry, molecular
biology and engineering. This needs to change. I also think that scientists except
when they are doing PR or speaking at prize-giving ceremonies know perfectly that
they are utterly immersed in the same cultural, economic and other conflicts,
contradictions and compromises as the rest of us. They hustle - more and more as
governments squeeze them. They really must give up their false-self facades.
I dont think what is important in these matters is that science
has an image problem or that the public doesnt understand it enough. I
think it has to clean up its act and that the first step in doing this is to realise that
it is not the arbiter of culture or above the battle but that it is a renegade part of
culture, naive and simplistic in its approach to the rest of human meaning and needs to
stop putzing around like a perpetual Bar Mitzvah boy, who was, after all, only supposed to
be smartypants for a day and thereafter to move toward responsible maturity.
I grew up in a locale where plain speaking and bearing witness to the
truth as best as one could discern it were highly valued. I hope my audience
will bear that in mind while pondering what I have said.
This is the revised text of a talk given at a conference on the
Changing Image of Science: The Role of the Media and Education, sponsored by
the British Universities Film and Video Council in association with the Wellcome Trust, at
the Wellcome Building, London, 15 December 1993.
REFERENCES
(Place of publication is London unless otherwise specified.)
Burtt, Edwin. A. (1932) The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern
Physical Science, 2nd ed., Routledge.
Haraway, Donna Jean (1989) Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature
in the World of Modern Science. Routledge.
______(1990) Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of
Nature. Free Association Books.
______ (1992) The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics
for Inappropriate/d Others, in. Grossberg et al., eds (1992), pp. 295-337.
Kolakowsky, Leszek. (1972) Positivist Philosophy from Hume to the Vienna Circle, revised
ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Rorty, Richard (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell.
______ (1982) Philosophy in America Today, in Consequences of Pragmatism
(Essays: 1972-1980), Minneapolis: Minnesota, pp. 211-32.
______ (1989) Contingency, in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge:
Cambridge, pp. 3-69.
Simon, Walter M. (1963) European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century. Ithaca,
N. Y. : Cornell.
Snow, Charles P. (1959) The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. The
Rede Lecture. Cambridge: Cambridge.
Whitehead, Alfred North (1925) Science and the Modern World N. Y.: Macmillan ;
reprinted Free Association Books, 1985..
Williams, Raymond (1958) Culture and Society 1780-1950. Chatto and Windus;
reprinted Penguin, 1961.
______ (1961) The Long Revolution. Chatto and Windus; reprinted Pelican, 1965.
______ (1974) Television: Technology and Cultural Form. Fontana.
______ (1976) Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Fontana.
______ (1979) Politics and Letters: Interviews with New Left Review. New Left
Books.
______ (1981) Culture. Fontana.
Young, Robert M. (1979) How Societies Constitute Their Knowledge:
Prolegomena to a Labour Process Perspective (typescript).
______ (1979a) Why Are Figures so Significant? The Role and the
Critique of Quantification, in J. Irvine et al., eds., Demystifying Social
Statistics. Pluto, pp. 63-75.
______ (1986) The Dense Medium: Television as Technology, Political
Papers (ILEA Community Education Publications Editorial Group) Special Issue on
Science And Technology no. 13, pp. 3-5.
______ (1986a) Life Among the Mediations: Labour, Groups,
Breasts, paper presented to Department of History and Philosophy of Science,
University of Cambridge.
______ (1989) Persons, Organisms... and Primary Qualities,
in J. Moore, ed., History, Humanity and Evolution: Essays for John C. Greene.
Cambridge University Press, pp. 375-401.
______ (1990) The Culture of British Psychoanalysis, paper
presented to the Philadelphia Association, London.
______ (1992) 'Benign and Virulent Projective Identification in Groups
and Institutions', paper presented at First European Conference of the Rowantree
Foundation, Wierden, Holland, and to the Institute for Psychotherapy and Social Research,
London.
______ (1992a) 'Science, Ideology and Donna Haraway', Sci. as
Culture (no. 15) 3: 7-46.
______ (1993) Darwin's Metaphor and the Philosophy of
Science, Sci. as Culture., (no. 16) 3: 375-403.
______ (1993a) Group Relations in Bulgaria, Bull.
Cent. Psychoanal. Stud. no. 5, pp. 7-11.
______ (1994) Mental Space. Process Press.
______ and Gardner, Carl (1981) Science on TV: a Critique,
in T. Bennett et al., eds., Popular Television and Film.. BFI Publishing,
pp. 171-93.
Address for Correspondence: 26 Freegrove Road, London N7 9RQ
e-mail: Robert@rmy1.demon.co.uk
© The Author
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